Why inter-agency operations break down
US counterterrorism in comparative perspective
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 13020530 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Frank Foley (0000-0001-7943-2508, King's College London, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2016 |
| Volume | 1 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 150-175 |
| Publication date | 2016-05-20 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | European Journal of International Security (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 2057-5637 • E-ISSN: 2057-5645 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/eis.2016.10 |
| OpenAlex | W2396262108 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
| References cited | 33 |
While US counterterrorism has improved in many respects since the attacks of 11 September 2001, there have still been turf battles and many cases of inadequate coordination between security agencies, which have had damaging effects on intelligence work and operations against terrorist groups. Why, more than 14 years after 9/11, do US inter-agency operations still break down in this manner? By comparing the United States with the United Kingdom, this article provides a new explanation for the deficiencies in the American response. It shows how US inter-agency conflict has negative operational consequences and draws a contrast with the British security agencies, which tend to be more closely integrated and refrain from engaging in major turf battles. I argue that the differences between the cases stem from a combination of distinct institutions and different organisational routines in the US and UK. In the United States, divided national institutions and the informal routines of its security agencies have proved problematic for joint operations and intelligence work. The article also critiques some influential existing accounts of US inter-agency counterterrorism, which emphasise bureaucratic politics or organisational culture, and shows how such perspectives can produce unrealistic policy recommendations. A focus on the deep-seated routines and institutions of the United States leads one to be more sceptical about the prospects for meaningful organisational reform
Agency (philosophy · Bureaucracy · International security · National security · Perspective (graphical · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Public relations · Skepticism · Social science · Sociology · Terrorism · United States National Security Agency · Work (physics · Engineering · Intelligence, Security, War Strategy · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Law · Public Administration · Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Political Violence
Speaking truth to power
In the Shadow of the Garrison State
The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis
Organizational routines
Essence of Decision
Strengthening the Shield
Countering Terrorism in Britain and France
How Terrorist Groups End
The Al Qaeda Factor
Counterterrorism Policy and the Political Process
The Plots that Failed
Assessing the Jihadist Terrorist Threat to America and American Interests
The Defence of the Realm
The expansion of intelligence agency mandates
Muslim “Homegrown” Terrorism in the United States
September 11 and the Adaptation Failure of U.S. Intelligence Agencies
The Organizational Process and Bureaucratic Politics Paradigms
Whole World on Fire
Countering Al-Qaeda in London
The Bureaucratic Politics of Security Institution Reform
Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics
War Makes the State, but Not as It Pleases
Reforming Counterterrorism
A Counterterrorism Strategy for the Obama Administration
Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms
| Unique citing works | 3 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,5 |
| Citation span | 2024 - 2026 (3) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 3 |