When Legal Conservatism Renders Salafi-Jihadis Lenient
The Intra-Salafi Debate about Being a Naturalized Citizen of an Infidel Country
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 13036883 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Eli Alshech (0000-0002-0589-2867, Bar-Ilan University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2023 |
| Volume | 14 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 393-413 |
| Publication date | 2023-10-02 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Journal of the Middle East and Africa (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 2152-0844 • E-ISSN: 2152-0852 |
| Publisher | Taylor & Francis (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/21520844.2023.2270882 |
| OpenAlex | W4389074530 |
| Language | EN |
Salafi-jihadis have a reputation of being conservative in the application of Islamic law and stringent in their legal rulings, whereas their traditional counterparts, the Salafi-taqlidis, are known to be less conservative and more lenient. Interestingly, in discussing the permissibility of becoming a naturalized citizen in an infidel country, a matter with serious ramifications under the doctrine of al-walāʼ wal-barāʼ, Salafi-jihadis and Salafi-taqlidis swap roles. While Salafi-jihadis adopt a lenient position, and allow Muslims to become naturalized citizens of infidel countries, Salafi-taqlidis prohibit Muslims from doing so. The current study outlines the Salafi debate about the lawfulness of obtaining citizenship in a non-Islamic country and reveals the curious twist that accounts for the unusual role-reversal on this matter between Salafi-jihadis and Salafi-taqlidis. This paper demonstrates that the Salafi-jihadis’ unyielding conservatism in defining which countries qualify as “truly” Muslim regimes and which do not, results in a lenient approach to naturalization. All mistakes are exclusively the author’s own.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.Notes1 As Carlo de Angelo has shown, Salafi-taqlidi scholars mostly agree that Muslims must eschew travels to non-Muslim state unless there is clear necessity such as medical treatment, business and da‘wa to non-Muslims. Carlo de Angelo, “From dār al-Islām to dār-kufr: Muslim Emigration to the West according to Salafi Jurisprudence,” Journal of Arabic and Islamic Studies 17 (2017): 204–222.2 According to Henri Lauziere the term “Salafi” as a reference to a full-fledged ideology “that encompassed the whole of existence, from knowledge to practice, from morality to etiquette” manifested only in the 1970s. Until then, to be a “Salafi” meant to adopt the theological approach of the righteous forefathers regarding the question of belief generally and tawḥīd specifically. Henri Lauziere, The Making of Salafism: Islamic Reform in the Twentieth Century (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016), 201. For more about the evolution of the notion of Salafiyya, see Laurent Bonnefoy, Salafism in Yemen: Transnationalsim and Religious Identity (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 39–78. On Salafi thought and conduct, see Bernard Haykel, “On the Nature of Salafi Thought and Action,” in Global Salafism: Islam’s New Religious Movement, ed. Roel Meijer (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 33–57. See also Shiraz Maher, Salafi-Jihadism: The History of an Idea (London: Hurst Publishers, 2016).3 Note that various scholars have recently challenged the claim that all Salafis adhere to the exact same doctrine (ʻaqīda). For a review of the literature on this matter, see Philipp Bruckmayr and Jan-Peter Hartung, “Introduction: Challenges from ‘The Periphery’?-Salafi Islam Outside the Arab World. Spotlight on Wider Asia,” Die Welt Des Islams 60 (2020): 150–51.4 Quintan Wiktorowicz, “Anatomy of a Salafi-Movement,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 29 (2006): 209.5 Wiktorowicz, “Anatomy of a Salafi-Movement,” 207–39. Joas Wagemakers, “Revisiting Wiktorowicz: Categorizing and Defining the Branches of Salafism,” in Salafism after the Arab Awakening: Contending with People’s Power, eds. Francesco Cavatorta and Fabio Merone (London: Husrt, 2016), 7–24.6 Wiktorowicz, “Anatomy of a Salafi-Movement,” 221. See also, Eli Alshech, “The Rise of a Charismatic Mujahid: The Salafi-jihadi Quest for Authority,” in Religious Knowledge, Authority, and Charisma: Islamic and Jewish Perspectives, eds. Dafna Ephrat and Meir Hatina (Salt Lake City: The University of Utah Press, 2014), 157–170.7 Wiktorowicz, “Anatomy of a Salafi-Movement,” 217.8 Joas Wagemakers, “Revisiting Wiktorowicz,” 7–24.9 The Salafiyya-Madkhaliyya is a sub-category of the politicos.10 On the early history of Wahhabism and the emergence of the Saudi State, see Stephane Lacroix, Awakening Islam: The Politics of Religious Dissent in Contemporary Saudi Arabia, trans. George Holoch (London: Harvard University Press, 2011), 8–36.11 Safar al-Ḥawālī, a prominent member of the politicos, “developed his stature as a result of his political analysis of American intensions in the Muslim world.” Wiktorowicz, “Anatomy of a Salafi-Movement,” 225. For Safar al-Ḥawālī’s book about American intentions in the world, see Safar al-Ḥawālī, Kashf al-ghumma ʻan ʻulamāʼ al-umma, (n.l.) 1991, https://bit.ly/3cO5Zat (accessed July 27, 2022).12 Wiktorowicz, “Anatomy of a Salafi-Movement,” 221.13 Ibn Qayyīm al-Jawzīyya, I‘lām al-muwaqqi‘īn ‘an rabb al-‘ālamīn (Cairo: Maktabat al-kullīyāt al-Azharīyya, 1968), 1: 87. This principle was also evoked by Ibn Tayīmyya in his well-known fatwa about fighting the Tatars. Ibn Taymīyya, Majmu“ al-fatāwā (Alexandria: Dār al-Wafā”, 2005), 28: 510.14 Wiktorowicz, “Anatomy of a Salafi-Movement,” 225.15 Wagemakers, “Revisiting Wiktorowicz,” 17.16 There was an earlier Salafi outburst in North Africa around the twelfth and thirteenth centuries CE. See Roger Le Tourneau, The Almohad Movement in North Africa in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969).17 The terms “Salafi-jihadi” and “Salafiyya-jihadiyya” were coined by Western writers but were later adopted by Salafi-jihadis themselves. See, for example, Abū Baṣīr al-Ṭarṭūsī who used the term “Salafiyya Jihadiyya” in an interview with the Sabīl newspaper. Odabasham.net, “Al-Ḥiwār maʻa jarīdat al-Sabīl al-urdunīyya,” n.d., accessed Feb. 24, 2022, https://bit.ly/3v9qnK9.18 Alshech, “The Rise of a Charismatic Mujahid,” 159.19 Ibid.20 About the legal debate within the Salafi-jihadi camp, see Eli Alshech, “The Doctrinal Crisis within the Salafi-Jihadi Ranks and the Emergence of Neo-Takfirism: A Historical and Doctrinal Analysis,” Islamic Law and Society, 21 (2014): 1–34.21 The ghulāt hold that belonging to a deviant group (e.g., Shi’i Islam) automatically renders all its members apostates without a need to bring evidence against each individual member.22 See, for example, the forum operated by iyāʼ al-Dīn al-Qudsī, http://www.davetulhaq.com/ar/forum/showthread.php?t=2215. Al-Qudsī is a prominent representative of the splinter group and was specifically criticized by Abū Baṣīr al-Ṭarṭūsī. See, Abū Baṣīr al-Ṭarṭūsī, “Al-Radd ʻalā al-madʻū iyāʼ al-Dīn al-Qudsī,“ n.d., http://fatawa-tartosi.blogspot.com/2013/08/blog-post_1103.html (accessed Aug. 23, 2020).23 Bruckmayr and Hartung, “Introduction: Challenges from ‘The Periphery’?” 159–169.24 Uriya Shavit, “Should Muslims Integrate into the West,” Middle East Studies 14.4 (2007): 13–21.25 On the doctrine of al-walā’ wa-l-barāʼ in modern Salafism, see Muḥammad ibn Saʻīd al-Qaḥṭānī, al-Walāʼ wa-l-barāʼ fī-l-Islām (n.p. n.d.), https://www.cia.gov/library/abbottabad-compound/11/111A8D7AFC90007275D4FAB39808C49A_Alwala_walbara.pdf (accessed Nov. 24, 2021); Mohamed Bin Ali, “The Islamic Doctrine of Al-Wala’ wal Bara’ (Loyalty and Disavowal) in Modern Salafism” (PhD dissertation, The University of Exeter, 2012). See also, Shiraz Maher, Salafi-jihadism, 125–141; and Joas Wagemakers, “The Transformation of a Radical Concept: Al-Walāʼ wal-Barāʼ in the Ideology of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi,” in Global Salafism: Islam’s New Religious Movement, ed. Roel Mejer (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 81–106.26 In an elaborate research piece on the subject Muḥammad al-Sabīl, a member of Hayʼat Kibār al-ʻUlamāʼ in Saudi Arabia, cites several violations of al-Walā’ wa-l-Barāʼ in this case. Muḥammad Ibn ʻAbd Allah al-Sabīl, “Ḥukm al-tajannus bi-jinsīyyat dawla ghayr Islāmīyya,” 2008, https://bit.ly/3yPkdzc (accessed July 15, 2022), 9.27 On the evolution of the notions of dār al-kufr or dār al-ḥarb, see, Giovanna Calasso and Lancioni Giuliano (eds.), Dār al-islām/dār al-ḥarb: Territories, People, Identities (Leiden: Brill, 2017), 1–18. About these two territorial categories in modern Indian Muslim thought, see Yohanan Friedmann, “Dār al-islām and dār al-ḥarb in Modern Indian Muslim Thought,” in Dār al-islām/dār al-ḥarb, eds. Calasso and Giuliano, 341–380. For a study on the different terminologies used in different Islamic written genres in reference to these territories, see Giovanna Calasso, “Constructing and Deconstructing the dār al-islām dār al-ḥarb Opposition,” in Dār al-islām/dār al-ḥarb, eds. Calasso and Jiuliano, 21–47.28 Sarah Albrecht, Dar al-Islam Revisited: Territoriality in Contemporary Islamic Legal Discourse on Muslims in the West (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 65.29 The jurists who allowed to stay on the occupied territories rendered it contingent on the ability to practice Islam in this territory.30 Albrecht, Dar al-Islam Revisited, 87ff.31 Albrecht, Dar al-Islam Revisited, 109. See also Susanne Olsson, Minority Jurisprudence in Islam: Muslim Communities in the West (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2016), 56ff and 137ff, for the Salafi-taqlidi attitude toward residing in the West.32 Albrecht, Dar al-Islam Revisited, 114.33 Ibid., 115.34 Khaled Abou El Fadl, “Islamic Law and Muslim Minorities: The Juristic Discourse on Muslim Minorities from the Second/Eighth to the Eleventh/Seventeenth Centuries,” Islamic Law and Society, 1.2 (1994): 141–187. Alexandre Caeiro, “The Social Construction of Sharia: Bank Interest, Home Purchase, and Islamic Norms in the West,” Die Welt des Islams, 44.3 (2004): 351–375. Shammai Fishman, Fiqh al-Aqalliyyat: A legal Theory for Muslim Minorities (Hudson Institute, 2006). See also, Said Fares Hassan, Fiqh al-Aqalliyyāt: History, Development, and Progress (New York: Palgrave Macmillian, 2013).35 Tauseef Ahmad Parray, “The Legal Methodology of ‘Fiqh al-Aqalliyyat’ and its Critics: An Analytical Study,” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 32 (2012): 88–107.36 On the difference in approach to the jurisprudence of minorities between Salafis and Muslim Brothers, see Uriya Shavit, Shari’a and Muslim Minorities: The Wasati and Salafi Approaches to Fiqh al-Aqalliyyat al-Muslima (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).37 Carlo de Angelo, “From dār al-Islām to dār-kufr.”38 Al-Lajna al-Dāʼima lil-Buḥūth al-ʻIlmīyya wa-l-Iftāʼ, “Ḥukm al-Tajannus bi-jinsīyyat al-kuffār al-aṣāghir,” July 25, 2009, https://bit.ly/3QPFyjU (accessed June 27, 2022).39 Al-Sabīl cites here several proof-texts to show that living among the infidels and applying for citizenship are acts of apostasy” Al-Sabīl, “Ḥukm al-tajannus.”40 Al-Lajna al-Dāʼima “Ḥukm al-tajannus.”41 The scholars addressing the questions on Islamweb rely heavily on Ḥanbalī jurisprudence and on the views of Salafi-taqlidi scholars in Saudi Arabia such as Ibn Bāz, Ibn al-‘Uthaymīn and others.42 Islamweb, “Shurūt jawāz al-ḥuṣūl ʻalā al-jinsīyya al-kāfira,” Oct. 8, 2012, https://bit.ly/3ysSwgk (accessed May 24, 2022).43 Shaykh ʻAbd al-Azīz al-Ṭarīfī, a Saudi scholar, expresses the same view. YouTube, “Ḥukm akhd jinsīyya ʼūrūbīyya: al-shaykh ʻAbd al-ʻAzīz al-Ṭarīfī,” n.d., https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gKe0mpn1RXg (accessed July 15, 2022).44 Khālid al-Mājid, a former member of Hayʼat al-Tadrīs bi-Kulīyyat al-Sharīʻa in Imām Muḥammad Ibn Saʻūd University in north Riyadh, expands the notion of necessity to include commerce, daʻwa and the pursuit of knowledge. However, Salafi-taqlidis in their legal responses generally adopt a much narrower definition of necessity. See Khālid Ibn Muḥammad al-Mājid, “Ḥukm al-tajannus bi-l-jinsīyya al-ʼūrubīyya lil-muslim,” n.d., http://www.saaid.net/Doat/Zugail/115.htm (accessed July 17, 2022).45 Islamweb, “Shurūṭ jawāz al-safar li-dawla kāfira wal-tajannus bi-jinsīyyatihā,” March 3, 2013, https://bit.ly/3z4Wr3n (accessed July 14, 2022).46 Islamweb, “Shurūṭ jawāz al-safar li-dawla kāfira wal-tajannus bi-jinsīyyatihā.”47 Al-Ṭarṭūsī is consistent in his approach as reflected in another answer of his. Al-Ṭarṭūsī, “Hal yajūz al-ḥuṣūl ʻalā jinsīyyat al-dawla al-kāfira wa-hal min lawāzim al-ḥuṣūl ʻalayhā al-wūqūʻ fī-l-kufr?” n.d., http://tartosi.blogspot.com/2012/11/blog-post_14.html?m=0 (accessed Aug. 4, 2022).48 Al-Ṭarṭūsī, n.d., https://bit.ly/3u7yupk, question number 214 (accessed June 27, 2022).49 Abū Muḥammad al-Maqdisī, Al-Kawāshif al-jalīyya fī kufr al-dawla al-sa‘ūdīyya, n.d., https://archive.org/details/doctor25250_gmail_20170317_1729 (accessed June 26, 2023). The fact that al-Maqdisī considered all Muslim states including Saudi Arabia as apostate is crucial, as shown below, to his willingness to allow naturalization in non-Muslim countries today.50 Abū Muḥammad al-Maqdisī, “Ḥukm al-tajannus bi-jinsīyya dawla kāfira,” n.d., https://ketabonline.com/ar/books/105333/read?part=1&page=1&index=2382978, (accessed June 27, 2022).51 Al-Maqdisī, “Ḥukm al-tajannus.”52 Ibid.53 Unlike the common Salafi-jihadi stance, Shaykh al-ʻAlwān, a Salafi-jihadi who lives in Saudi Arabia, instructs a refugee not to apply for citizenship unless the infidel state threatens him that if he refuses, it will extradite him to his state of origin. YouTube, “Mā ḥukm al-tajannus bi-l-jinsīyya al-amrīkīyya waghayrihā min duwal al-kufr: Shaykh Sulaymān bin Nāṣr al-ʻAlwān,” n.d., https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OczGSe_vwvY (accessed July 20, 2022).54 Al-Maqdisī, “Ḥukm al-tajannus.”55 The only exception is the Wahhabis in Saudi Arabia who seem to follow more closely the ruling of the Hanbali school. Frank E. Vogel, Islamic Law and Legal Systems: Studies of Saudi Arabia (Leiden: Brill, 2000), 126.56 Vogel, Islamic Law, 125.57 The second condition of “being guarded by Muslims” is required only by some Ḥanbalis and Ḥanbali inspired scholars. See, for example, Ibn ʻAbd al-Wahhāb, Al-Siyāsa al-sharʻīyya aw niẓām al-dawla al-Islāmiyya fī al-shuʼūn al-dustūrīyya wal-khārijīyya wal-mālīyya (Cairo: Al-Maṭbaʻa al-Salafīyya, 1931), 69.58 Muḥammad Haykal, Al-Jihād wal-qitāl fī-l-siyāsa al-sharʻīyya (Beirut: Dār al-Bayārq, 1996), 662. See also Ibn Qayyīm al-Jawzīyya, Aḥkām ahl al-dhimma (Beirut: Dār al-ʻIlm li-l-Malāyin, 1994), 366.59 Mālikīs require Muslim residents of an abode of infidelity who can practice their religion there to make hijra to the abode of Islam. Abū ʻAbd Allah al-Qurṭubī, Al-Jāmiʻ li-aḥkām al-Qurʼān (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʻIlmīyya, 1996), 3: 224. Shāfiʻī jurists do not require, but only recommend, hijra when a Muslim can practice his religion in the abode of kufr. Abū al-Ḥasan al-Māwardī, Al-Ḥāwī al-kabīr (Beirut: Dār al-kutub al-ʻIlmīyya, 1999), 14: 103.60 Ibn Qudāma, Al-Mughnī (Cairo: Hajr lil-Tibāʻa wal-Nashr, 1992), 13:151. This view is expressed in Ibn Taymīyya, Majmūʻa al-fatāwā (Cairo: Dār al-Ḥadīth, 2006), 14: 407.61 Ibn ʻAbd al-Wahhāb (d. 1792), another source of inspiration for modern Salafis, requires, and not just recommend, migration from the abode of infidelity even when a Muslim is able to fulfill his religious duties there. ʻAbd al-Raḥmān Ibn Muḥammad Ibn Qāsim al-ʻĀṣimī al-Najdī, Al-Durar al-sanīyya fī-l-ajwiba al-najdīyya (Riyadh, 2012), 8: 238.62 Hanbalis reject the claim that migration out of the abode of infidelity is no longer mandatory after the conquest of Mecca because of the ḥadīth: “There is no hijra after the victory (fatḥ) [in Mecca].” Hanbali jurists explain that they rule by a different ḥadīth: “Hijra will not cease until repentance will not cease, and repentance will not cease until the sun rises from the West [i.e., on the day of Judgement].” Ibn Qudāma, Al-Mughnī, 13: 150.63 Ibn Qudāma, Al-Mughnī, 13: 151.64 Ibid.65 ʻAbd al-Raḥmān, Al-Durar, 8: 291.66 Michael Cook, Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong in Islamic Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).67 In his concluding remarks ʻAbd al-Raḥmān states that when Muslims are unable to rectify the situation in the abode of Islam they must migrate. ʻAbd al-Raḥmān, Al-Durar, 8: 291.68 ʻAbd al-Raḥmān, Al-Durar, 8:161–2.69 Ibn Taymīyya, Majmūʻa al-fatāwā, 14: 427.70 Some medieval scholars claim that under certain conditions an abode of Islam may revert back to its pre-Islamic status of an abode of infidelity. Haykal, Al-Jihād wal-qitāl, 662.71 It is unclear whether Ibn Taymīyya considered the “abode of war” to be synonymous with the “abode of kufr.” This may be the case, but with lack of more evidence it is difficult to determine.72 Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī, Fiqh al-jihād (Cairo: Maktabat Wahbah, 2009), 888–895. Al-Qaraḍāwī cites several modern scholarly views, some of whom claim that a Muslim territory can never revert to being an abode of kufr even when ruled by infidels. Others add a condition, saying that when Muslim inhabitants continue to perform Islamic rituals, the territory retains its Islamic status. For other scholars who view current Muslim countries as an abode of Islam, see Albrecht, Dar al-Islam Revisited.73 Ibn Bāz, “Kayfīyya iʻtibār al-dawla dawla Islāmīyya,” n.d., https://bit.ly/398xBFD (accessed May 25, 2022).74 Ibn al-ʻUthaymīn, “Shurūt iʻtibār al-dār dār al-kufr aw Islām,” Aug. 1, 2013, https://bit.ly/3QfUNmf (accessed May 23, 2022).75 Here Ibn al-ʻUthaymīn, like most Salafi-taqlidis, rely on the ḥadīth by Ibn ‘Abbās which explains Qurʼān 5:44 “And those who do not rule with what Allah revealed are kāfirūn” as a minor kufr (kufr dūna kufr) which does not take one outside the fold of Islam.” See Ibn Bāz, “Mā maʻnā ‘wa-man lam yaḥkum bimā anzala Allah fa-̓ūlaʼika hum al-kāfirūn?” n.d., https://bit.ly/3Q7VLRh (accessed June 8, 2022).76 Ibn al-ʻUthaymīn, “Shurūt iʻtibār al-dār dār al-kufr aw Islām.”77 YouTube, “Al-Shaykh Ṣāliḥ al-Fawzān: Al-Radd ʻalā man yakūl ana al-dawla al-saʻūdiyya tuwālī al-kufār walā taḥkum bi-l-sharīʻa,” n.d., https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zufxKS2mVPA (accessed July 13, 2022).78 Shaykh Muḥammad Naṣr al-Dīn al-Albānī was an expert on hadith. He was born in Albania and left with his family to Damascus where he became famous for his research on hadith. He taught hadith for two years at the Islamic University of al-Madina and subsequently taught in various cities in Syria and Jordan.79 YouTube, “Mā huwa al-ḍābiṭ li-l-ḥukm ʻalā al-dār bi-anahā dār kufr?” n.d., https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6cgKmrznb8A (accessed July 13, 2022).80 About the legal debate within the Salafi-jihadi camp, see Alshech, “The Doctrinal Crisis.”81 Abū Maryam ʻAbd al-Raḥmān al-Mukhlif, Al-Tawḥīd wal-jihād: ayahumā al-aṣl? n.d. https://bit.ly/3xQfii6 (accessed Aug. 25, 2016),11–12. In file with author.82 iyāʼ al-Dīn al-Qudsī, “Gharīb al-diyār,” Oct. 13, 2014, http://www.davetulhaq.com/ar/forum/showthread.php?t=3239 (accessed June 23, 2022).83 iyāʼ al-Dīn al-Qudsī, “Hal miṣr dār ḥarb?” Oct. 22, 2013, http://www.davetulhaq.com/ar/forum/showthread.php?t=2215 (accessed June 23, 2022).84 Abū Muḥammad al-Maqdisī, Al-Risāla al-thalāthanīyya fī-l-taḥdhīr min al-ghulūw fī al-takfīr, n.d., https://bit.ly/2lGreQM (accessed June 16, 2022), 107.85 Abū Baṣīr al-Ṭarṭūsī, Kitāb qawāʻid fī takfīr, n.d, n.p https://altartosi.net/3416 (accessed Aug. 7, 2022), 213.86 Abū Hammām al-Atharī, a Salafi-jihadi scholar, also deems contemporary Muslim countries as an abode of kufr. Abū Hammām al-Atharī, “Hal tusamā bilād al-Muslimīn al-yawm dār kufr?” Jan. 12, 2010, https://ketabonline.com/ar/books/7268/read?part=17&page=888&index=5311127/5311142 (accessed June 4, 2023).87 Al-Ṭarṭūsī made an explicit link between the status of Muslim countries today and that of the city of Mārdīn. Al-Ṭarṭūsī, “Shubahāt wal-radd ʻalayhā,” Nov. 3, 2012, http://tartosi.blogspot.com/2012/11/blog-post_0.html (accessed Aug. 5, 2022).88 Abū Maryam, al-Radd ‘alā shubahāt Abī Mārīya, 55. In file with author.89 According to some Muslim scholars, the presence of an infidel worshipper at the mosque during public prayer can invalidate the prayer of believers attending that mosque. See, Ibn Qudāma, al-Mughnī, 3: 56.Additional informationNotes on contributorsEli AlshechEli Alshech is a senior lecturer at Bar Ilan University. He specializes in Islamic radicalism, Salafi-jihadi legal thought, and the various manifestations of jihad in the Cyberspace. His publications are a reflection of this, dealing with diverse topics among them the concept of privacy in early Islamic legal thought, the rise of neo-takfirism, the doctrine of al-wala’ wal-bara’ in Salafi-jihadi thought, and the concept of martyrdom as reflected in Hamas’s publications. He recently co-authored a book (with Nimrod Hurvitz) entitled: Making Sense of Muslim Fundametalisms: The Clash within Islam. He is currently working on a new book examining al-wala’ wal-bara’ in daily life
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