Politicians Do Pander

The capabilities of the American state sometimes depend on the ability of policy-makers to act autonomously, on the basis of their own preferences and beliefs, in ways that serve broad societal and state interests but lack support from powerful constituencies. In a highly acclaimed book on the politics of health care reform in the Clinton administration, Jacobs and Shapiro (2000) argue that "politicians don't pander." Rather, they do indeed act on their own ideological and policy views, using polls mainly to guide rhetorical strategy, not to make policy decisions. I challenge their interpretation and bring to bear other considerations to argue for an increased influence of mass opinion, and to present a high-pandering, limited-autonomy account of the contemporary politics of law-making. In concluding, I comment briefly on this account's consistency with recent events and on the issues it poses for future research

Autonomy · Ideology · Interpretation (philosophy · Law and economics · Polarization (electrochemistry · Political science · Politics · Public relations · Rhetorical question · Sociology · Judicial and Constitutional Studies · Law · Policy Transfer and Learning · Public Administration · Public Policy and Administration Research

• Simulating Representation

  Open Access•Robert Y Shapiro, Lawrence R Jacobs•The Forum•2010

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