Prosociality, Federalism, and Cultural Evolution
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 13100882 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Jenna Bednar (0000-0002-0840-3782, University of Michigan, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2012 |
| Volume | 3 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Publication date | 2012-06-30 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Cliodynamics The Journal of Quantitative History and Cultural Evolution (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 2373-7530 • E-ISSN: 2373-7530 |
| Publisher | California Digital Library (CDL) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.21237/c7clio3112313 |
| OpenAlex | W117886894 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 20 |
Constitutions are more than their text; a constitution is also a set of conventions, or expectations that constituents have about one another's behavior. That is, constitutions have a culture. The coherence between the constitutional law and constitutional culture determine a constitution's success. Constitutional culture and constitutional law co-evolve; by understanding the influence of multiple institutions, one may make predictions about the likelihood of the emergence of a prosocial constitutional culture. There are reasons to believe that federalism might encourage the development of a prosocial constitutional culture, but the effect is far from certain.This essay concludes with questions to consider in while assessing Afghanistan's prospects for constitutional success
Coherence (philosophical gambling strategy · Constitution · Constitutional economics · Constitutional law · Federalism · Law and economics · Legal culture · Political science · Politics · Prosocial behavior · Set (abstract data type · Sociology · American Constitutional Law and Politics · Computer Science · Culture, Economy, and Development Studies · Gender, Labor, and Family Dynamics · Law · Psychology · Social Psychology
The Robust Federation
Foundations of Human Sociality
In Search of Homo Economicus
Veto Players
Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics
The Best Laid Plans
Revised-Path Dependence
Determinants of public education spending in 21 OECD democracies, 1980–2001
Federalism and Constitutional Design
Explaining public education expenditure in OECD nations
The impact of constitutional structures and collective and competitive veto points on income inequality in industrialized democracies
Global, Constitutional, and Partisan Determinants of Redistribution in Fifteen OECD Countries
On the Political Economy of Welfare Expansion
Can Game(s) Theory Explain Culture
Emergent cultural signatures and persistent diversity
The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of the Law
An Evolutionary Approach to Norms
Politics, Institutions, and Welfare Spending in Industrialized Democracies, 1960-82
The Evolution of Norms
Social Democracy, Christian Democracy, Constitutional Structure, and the Welfare State
| Highly cited | No |
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