Transparency effects on policy compliance

Disclosing how defaults work can enhance their effectiveness

Bibliographic Data

ID13109173
AuthorsYavor Paunov (0000-0002-7595-3258, University of Mannheim, corresponding author), Michaela Wänke (0000-0003-0413-9838, University of Mannheim), Tobias Vogel (0000-0002-5768-1391, University of Mannheim)
Year2018
Volume3
Issue02
Pages187-208
Publication date2018-11-09
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueBehavioural Public Policy (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 2398-063X • E-ISSN: 2398-0648
PublisherCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/bpp.2018.40
OpenAlexW2900143476
LanguageEN
Citations received23
References cited22

From an ethical standpoint, transparency is an essential requirement in public policy-making. Ideally, policy-makers are transparent and actively disclose the presence, purpose and means of a decision aid. From a practical point of view, however, transparency has been discussed as reducing the effectiveness of decision aids. In the present paper, we elaborate on how transparency affects the effectiveness of defaults. In three experiments, we manipulated whether the endorser was transparent about the default or not and assessed participants’ decisions to opt out or comply. Throughout the experiments, we found that proactive transparency reduced opt-out rates as compared to a non-transparent default condition. Moreover, proactive disclosure of a default reduced opt-out rates as compared to informed control groups, where participants imagined they had retrieved the default-related information by themselves (Studies 1 and 2). The results further indicate that a lack of proactive disclosure may lead targets to perceive the endorser as less sincere and to feel deceived, which in turn hinders the effectiveness of the default. In general, our findings lend support to the proactive transparency paradigm in governance and show that a default-based policy can be transparent and effective at the same time

Actuarial science · Affect (linguistics · Business · Compliance (psychology · Computer security · Control (management · Corporate governance · Default · Transparency (behavior · Work (physics · Computer Science · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Psychology · Public Policy and Administration Research · Social Psychology · Accounting · Artificial Intelligence · Finance

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