Empathy, Motivating Reasons, and Morally Worthy Action
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 13598725 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Elizabeth Ventham (0000-0002-8759-5339, University of Salzburg, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2023 |
| Volume | 59 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 827-839 |
| Publication date | 2023-11-24 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Journal of Value Inquiry (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-5363 • E-ISSN: 1573-0492 |
| Publisher | Springer Science+Business Media (PUBLISHER • DE) |
| DOI | 10.1007/s10790-023-09972-3 |
| OpenAlex | W4388971402 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
| References cited | 22 |
Contemporary literature criticises a necessary link between empathy and actions that demonstrate genuine moral worth. If there is such a necessary link, many argue, it must come in the developmental stages of our moral capacities, rather than being found in the mental states that make up our motivating reasons. This paper goes against that trend, arguing that critics have not considered how wide-ranging the mental states are that make up a person’s reasons. In particular, it argues that empathy can play a role in moral motivation when it is to some extent unconscious or it occurs far prior to the moral action itself
Action (physics · Cognitive psychology · Empathy · Epistemology · Mental state · Mirror neuron · Moral disengagement · Morality · Psychoanalysis · Simulation theory of empathy · Sociology · Unconscious mind · Ethics in Business and Education · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Social Psychology
EmpathyPhilosophical and Psychological Perspectives
Empathy
Against Empathy
Empathy
Acting for the Right Reasons
The Unreliability of Naive Introspection
Backgrounding Desire
Empathy and the Value of Humane Understanding
Moral Worth and Moral Knowledge
In Praise of Desire
Moral Worth
The pursuit of unhappiness
| Citations per year | 1.5 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2024 - 2026 (3) |
| Highly cited | No |