When Moral Pleasure Conflicts with Moral Sorrow
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 13599159 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Drishtti Rawat (0009-0003-6295-4029, University of Cambridge, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2024 |
| Publication date | 2024-11-23 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Journal of Value Inquiry (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-5363 • E-ISSN: 1573-0492 |
| Publisher | Springer Science+Business Media (PUBLISHER • DE) |
| DOI | 10.1007/s10790-024-10019-4 |
| OpenAlex | W4404642509 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 22 |
In this paper, I discuss two of Aristotle’s major requirements for the virtuous person. First, the virtuous person takes pleasure in virtuous activity. Second, the virtuous person experiences the appropriate affective states in the appropriate situations. However, in some situations, the appropriate affective state is sorrow. In such situations, it appears that the virtuous person is expected to experience two conflicting emotions, namely, moral pleasure and moral sorrow. This conflict raises the deeper concern that the virtuous person has conflicting values and leads critics to reject Aristotle’s requirement of moral pleasure. I argue that critics need not take such measures because the conflict in the virtuous person’s values is merely apparent. I do this by first considering potential solutions, including an appeal to a de dicto interpretation of moral pleasure, and discussing how they prove unsatisfactory. Then, I recommend a desire-based understanding of moral pleasure and analyse the values underlying it. Through this analysis, I reveal that the virtuous person’s moral pleasure and moral sorrow indicate the same kind of value to the same objects of concern. And, because the virtuous person’s moral sorrow indicates the same value for virtuous activity, I conclude that it is necessary for a person to be able to experience moral pleasure and to be considered a virtuous person in the first place
Pleasure · Sorrow · Free Will and Agency · Neuroscience · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Social Psychology
Viii Persons, Character and Morality
Immanuel Kant: Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals
The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories
Complete Works of Aristotle, Volume 2
Pleasure as a Sign of Moral Virtue in the Nicomachean Ethics
Acting for the Right Reasons
Attitudinal and Phenomenological Theories of Pleasure
The motivational state of the virtuous agent
Desire-Based Theories of Reasons, Pleasure, and Welfare1
Moral Worth
| Highly cited | No |
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