Neo-Cortical Tests and Personal Death

A Reply to Robert Veatch

Bibliographic Data

ID13627987
AuthorsElizabeth A Linehan (Department of Philosophy, St. Joseph's University, corresponding author)
Year1982
Volume12
Issue4
Pages329-337
Publication date1982-06-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueOMEGA - Journal of Death and Dying (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0030-2228 • E-ISSN: 1541-3764
PublisherSAGE Publishing (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.2190/67m2-wfgy-9l9h-5rkk
PMID11650542
OpenAlexW2028860926
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited4

Irreversible coma caused by the destruction of the whole brain has gained wide acceptance as an alternative to the traditional heart/lung approach to defining death. Robert Veatch has proposed an “updating” of the whole brain criteria to allow destruction of the neo-cortex alone to indicate the death of the person. This paper examines Veatch's definition of death, and its application to persons. Veatch's argument that a person is dead when he has irreversibly lost the capacities for conscious experience and social interaction confuses the criteria by which we determine that something is a person with the meaning of being a person. In so doing, it begs an important question: the relationship between the person and his body. Until that issue is resolved, the safer (and therefore morally preferable) course is to use the more stringent whole brain criteria for deciding when death has occurred

Argument (complex analysis · Meaning (existential · Political science · Psychoanalysis · Psychotherapist · Adversarial Robustness in Machine Learning · Law · Medicine · Neuroethics, Human Enhancement, Biomedical Innovations · Paranormal Experiences and Beliefs · Psychology

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