Skip to main content

ETHNOS_APP

Home • Search • Journals • List 0

Crime Rates and Public Expenditures for Police Protection

A Reply

Bibliographic Data

ID13693237
AuthorsMichael J Greenwood (Arizona State University, corresponding author), Walter J Wadycki (University of Illinois System)
Year1975
Volume33
Issue1
Pages81-84
Publication date1975-04-01
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueReview of Social Economy (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0034-6764 • E-ISSN: 1470-1162
PublisherRoutledge (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/00346767500000007
OpenAlexW1978435572
LanguageEN
Citations received3
References cited3

Gary Becker's suggestive work on crime leads to the prediction that increased police protection results in decreased crime rates by increasing the cost of crime to the perpetrator. However, certain recent studies that have attempted to explain crime rates using cross-sectional data for the United States have arrived at the unanticipated result that increased police protection results in increased measured crime rates. One pro? posed explanation for this observed tendency is that simultaneity bias is inherent in the coefficient of the police protection variable in a crime-rate equation because localities with high crime rates tend to allocate more resources to police protection. In our original paper we have actually specified a simultaneous-equations model that accounts for such hypoth? esized feedbacks, and still our results indicate that increased police pro? tection results in increased measured crime. Our explanation for this finding is that police perform two primary functions, crime detection and crime prevention. Moreover, we have formulated a simple numerical example to demonstrate the notion that if the efficiency of a marginal policeman is greater in crime detection than in crime prevention, mea? sured crime could rise with increases in police inputs. In their recent comment on our paper Zipin, Mabry, and Dyer (ZMD) make three important points. First, they argue that we have re? versed the causal direction of the typically specified relationship between police and crime. Second, they suggest that for the types of crimes we have analyzed police perform no detection function. Finally, they assert that the positive causal relationship we find between police and crime rates is the result of our using inappropriate, 1962 expenditures data to explain 1960 crime rates. In our reply we respond in order to each of these points. By no means do we reverse the causal direction of the typically specified (inverse) relationship between police and crime. As a matter 81

Crime prevention · Crime rate · Criminology · Economics · Function (biology · Simultaneity · Crime Patterns and Interventions · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems · Psychology · Regulation and Compliance Studies

  • Economics of Crime

    Jørgen Aasness, Terje Skjerpen et al.•Economics of crime•1994

  • La dissuasion des homicides volontaires

    Nicolas Gérard Vaillant, Nicolas Vaillant et al.•Revue économique•2011

  • Drug crime in Taiwan

    Furjen Denq, Lou‐jou Lee et al.•Deviant Behavior•1996

  • Crime and Punishment

    Gary S Becker•Journal of Political Economy•1968

  • Crime Rates and Public Expenditures for Police Protection

    Michael J Greenwood, Walter J Wadycki•Review of Social Economy•1973

  • Crime Rates and Public Expenditures for Police Protection

    Paul Mark Zipin, Rodney H Mabry et al.•Review of Social Economy•1974

Citations per year0.09
Citation span1994 - 2011 (18)
Highly citedNo

Tools

Open DOISci-Hub
Ethnos_APP • Open Source Project • MIT License • Frontend v2.0.0 • Privacy and Cookies • API Documentation: api.ethnos.app/docs • API Source Code: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17049435 • Frontend Source Code: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17050053 • cruz.rio.br • Expectantes Misericordiae