Financial Incentives and Gaming in Alcohol Treatment

Bibliographic Data

ID13774880
AuthorsMingshan Lu (0000-0002-6083-1098, University of Calgary, corresponding author), Ching-to Albert Ma, Ching‐to Albert (0000-0002-8985-1594)
Year2006
Volume43
Issue1
Pages34-53
Publication date2006-02-01
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueINQUIRY The Journal of Health Care Organization Provision and Financing (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0046-9580 • E-ISSN: 1945-7243
PublisherSAGE Publishing (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.5034/inquiryjrnl_43.1.34
PMID16838817
OpenAlexW2321245838
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited21

This study looks at the effect of performance-based contracting (PBC) on administrative information misreports in substance abuse treatment in Maine. For about 700 alcohol abuse treatment episodes in the period 1990-1995, we constructed clinician report gaming indicators from two data sets: the Maine Addiction Treatment System (MATS) and medical record abstracts. Gaming, in this study, refers to differences in MATS reports and the medical records for an episode. Under PBC, which was implemented in 1992, a provider's financial reward was positively related to treatment outcomes measured by some reports from MATS. We found that the introduction of PBC increased gaming. The data supported the hypotheses that clinicians overstated patient severity at the beginning of treatment episodes, and understated severity at the end

Actuarial science · Addiction · Addiction treatment · Alcohol abuse · Business · Economics · Incentive · Medical emergency · Medical record · Medical treatment · Psychiatry · Substance abuse · Substance abuse treatment · Finance · Healthcare Policy and Management · Internal Medicine · Medicine · Patient Satisfaction in Healthcare · Pharmaceutical industry and healthcare · Psychology

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