Certificate of Need Laws in Health Care

Past, Present, and Future

Bibliographic Data

ID13775971
AuthorsMatthew D Mitchell (0000-0002-9145-9962, Knee Regulatory Research Center at West Virginia University, Morgantown, WV, USA, corresponding author)
Year2024
Volume61
Pages469580241251937-469580241251937
Publication date2024-01-01
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueINQUIRY The Journal of Health Care Organization Provision and Financing (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0046-9580 • E-ISSN: 1945-7243
PublisherSAGE Publishing (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1177/00469580241251937
PMID38727175
OpenAlexW4396799480
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited40

Certificate of need (CON) laws limit the supply of health care services in about two-thirds of U.S. states. The regulations require those who wish to offer new services or expand existing services to first prove to a regulator that the care is needed. While advocates for the regulation have offered several rationales for its continuance, the balance of evidence suggests that the rules protect incumbent providers from competition at the expense of patients, payors, and would-be competitors. In this article, I review the history of CON laws in health care, summarize the large literature evaluating them, and briefly sketch options for reform. JEL Classification: I11, I18, H75

Business · Competition (biology · Competitor analysis · Economics · Health care · Law and economics · Political science · Sketch · Computer Science · Healthcare Policy and Management · Law · Marketing · Pharmaceutical Economics and Policy · Pharmaceutical industry and healthcare

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