The Synthetic Significance of Analytic Statements
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 14110443 |
|---|---|
| Authors | William W Rozeboom (University of Alberta, corresponding author), William Rozeboom |
| Year | 1977 |
| Volume | 16 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 464-471 |
| Publication date | 1977-09-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Dialogue (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0012-2173 • E-ISSN: 1759-0949 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0012217300045510 |
| OpenAlex | W2012767432 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 2 |
In his essay “Brains and Behavior” in Analytical Philosophy , edited by R. Butler, 2nd Series, Blackwell, 1965), Putnam has contended that Logical Behaviourism is not merely dead, its corpse has become olfactorily unattractive. For, says Putnam, while the translatability of mentalistic terms into the vocabulary of overt behaviour is no longer a live issue, innocent philosophers are still being corrupted by sinful urges of a Logical-Behaviouristic sort, namely, (a) suspicion that statements relating behaviour to mental events may be more than just synthetic, and (b) the possibility that the translatability thesis breaks down purely and simply through a mismatching of vagueness in the way, e.g., that a statement about baldness fails at translation into a statement about the number of hairs on a person's head merely because of the inherent vagueness of the term ‘bald’. But while the latter version of neo-Logical-Behaviourism can be dismissed with a curt reminder of what has been learned about the observational irreducibility even of dispositional terms, I remain unconvinced that propositions linking mental and behavioural events are wholly devoid of analytic support
Counterexample · Epistemology · Linguistics · Logical consequence · Metaphysics · Negation · Philosophy of language · sort · Statement (logic) · Vagueness · Verstehen · Computer Science · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Philosophy, Science, and History · Psychology
| Citations per year | 0.03 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 1996 - 1996 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |