Metainduction over Unboundedly Many Prediction Methods
A Reply to Arnold and Sterkenburg
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 14433013 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Gerhard Schurz (0000-0002-4107-9240, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2021 |
| Volume | 88 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 320-340 |
| Publication date | 2021-04-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophy of Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8248 • E-ISSN: 1539-767X |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1086/711587 |
| OpenAlex | W3084685860 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 11 |
The universal optimality theorem for metainduction works for epistemic agents faced with a choice among finitely many prediction methods. Eckhart Arnold and Tom Sterkenburg objected that it breaks down for infinite or unboundedly growing sets of methods. In this article the metainductive approach is defended against this challenge by extending the optimality theorem (i) to unboundedly growing sets of methods whose number grows less than exponentially in time, (ii) to sequences of methods with an application to Goodman's problem, and (iii) to infinite sets of methods whose number of predictive equivalence classes grows less than linearly in time
Discrete mathematics · Equivalence (formal languages) · Mathematical economics · Advanced Bandit Algorithms Research · Computability, Logic, AI Algorithms · Computer Science · Machine Learning and Algorithms · Mathematics
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The Logic of Reliable Inquiry
Hume's Problem Solved
The Metainductive Justification of Induction
No Free Lunch Theorem, Inductive Skepticism, and the Optimality of Meta-induction
Can the Best-Alternative Justification Solve Hume's Problem? On the Limits of a Promising Approach
The Meta-inductivist's Winning Strategy in the Prediction Game
| Citations per year | 0.4 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2021 - 2024 (4) |
| Highly cited | No |