On Reproducing Social Reality
A Reply to Harrison
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 14567783 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Robert Feleppa (0000-0001-7250-6981, Wichita State University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1986 |
| Volume | 16 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 89-99 |
| Publication date | 1986-03-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophy of the Social Sciences (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0048-3931 • E-ISSN: 1552-7441 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1177/004839318601600106 |
| OpenAlex | W2065510399 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 1 |
That social inquirers should be careful about the intrusion of biases and questionable \nethnocentric presuppositions is a widely accepted and unquestionably \ncogent methodological dictum. Less widely accepted, and perhaps less cogent, \nis the view that such intrusions are best avoided by inquirers adopting the \ninterpretive constructs, points of view, etc., of their subjects. Debates over this \nlatter point have flared up repeatedly in twentieth-century philosophical and \nsocial-scientific literature, notably in the extensive discussions of Peter Winch’ss \nThe Idea of a Social Science (ISS) and ’Understanding a Primitive Society’ \n(UPS). His contention that proper social inquiry is actually a form of \nconceptual-analytic epistemology, aimed necessarily at the recovery and use by \nthe inquirer of certain rules and criteria operative within the source-language \ncommunity in the individuation of social actions, makes Winch clearly a proponent \nof the latter, controversial thesis. \nThe late Richard Rudner (’Some Essays at Objectivity’ [EO]) has challenged \n’ Winch, contending that his thesis rests on what Rudner calls the ’reproductive \nfallacy’ of assuming that the function of a social description is to reproduce \naspects of what it describes. Recently, Stanley Harrison (’Rudner’s Reproductive \nFallacy’ [RF]) has taken issue with Rudner’s critique, charging that it \ncommits a fallacy of somewhat older vintage, namely, of attacking a straw man. \nRudner, he claims, by not attending with care to Winch’s important distinction \nbetween reflective and unreflective understanding, and by not keeping in mind \nthe differences in view between himself and Winch regarding the nature of \nreflective understanding, creates the confusion and inconsistency he ostensibly \nfinds in Winch. However, I shall argue that Harrison has misconstrued the thrust \nand content of Rudner’s argument, and though this may result in part from the \nway Rudner formulates certain points, these can be clarified and Rudner’s telling \nobjections to Winch’s and related views sustained
Epistemology · Sociology · Contemporary Sociological Theory and Practice · Philosophy
| Highly cited | No |
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