Keeping the Heart”
Natural Affection in Joseph Butler's Approach to Virtue
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 14760514 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Sarah Moses (University of Mississippi, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2009 |
| Volume | 37 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 613-629 |
| Publication date | 2009-12-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Religious Ethics (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0384-9694 • E-ISSN: 1467-9795 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1467-9795.2009.00404.x |
| OpenAlex | W2146317134 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 10 |
This essay considers eighteenth‐century Anglican thinker Joseph Butler's view of the role of natural emotions in moral reasoning and action. Emotions such as compassion and resentment are shown to play a positive role in the moral life by motivating action and by directing agents toward certain good objects—for example, relief of misery and justice. For Butler, moral virtue is present when these natural affections are kept in proper proportion by the “superior” principles of the moral life—conscience, self‐love, and benevolence—which involve the capacity for reasonable reflection. For contemporary thinkers, Butler's approach suggests that natural emotion should not be viewed as the enemy of moral reasoning; in fact, it challenges ethicists to pay attention to and account for the significant role of the emotions in the moral life
Action (physics · Affection · Compassion · Conscience · Economic Justice · Environmental ethics · Epistemology · Forgiveness · Moral psychology · Moral reasoning · Natural (archaeology · Political science · Resentment · Sociology · Sympathy · The good life · Theology · Virtue · Emotions and Moral Behavior · Law · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Psychology of Social Influence · Social Psychology
| Highly cited | No |
|---|