Kierkegaard and Evans on the Problem of Abraham
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 14760742 |
|---|---|
| Authors | R Zachary Manis (Southwest Baptist University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2011 |
| Volume | 39 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 474-492 |
| Publication date | 2011-09-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Religious Ethics (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0384-9694 • E-ISSN: 1467-9795 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1467-9795.2011.00490.x |
| OpenAlex | W1732064617 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 8 |
A significant challenge faces any ethic that endorses the view that divine commands are sufficient to impose moral obligations; in this paper, I focus on Kierkegaard's ethic, in particular. The challenge to be addressed is the “modernized” problem of Abraham, popularized especially by Fear and Trembling : the dilemma that an agent faces when a being claiming to be God issues a command to the agent that, by the agent's own lights, seems not to be the kind of command that a loving God would issue. Against a solution to this problem proposed by C. Stephen Evans in Kierkegaard's Ethic of Love , I argue that Kierkegaard regards this scenario as never actually resulting in a fully responsible agent's performance of some horrendous action on account of her non‐culpable misinterpretation of God's will and/or failure to discern correctly whether a perceived moral imperative truly is divine in origin
Action (physics · Dilemma · Environmental ethics · Epistemology · Focus (optics · Moral dilemma · Kierkegaardian Philosophy and Influence · Philosophy · Philosophy, Ethics, and Existentialism · Psychology · Social Psychology · Theology and Philosophy of Evil
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |