Groundwater management institutions in the face of rapid urbanization – Results of a framed field experiment in Bengaluru, India
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 14865895 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Johannes Wegmann (0000-0002-7324-7747, University of Göttingen, autor de correspondencia), O Musshoff (0000-0002-3746-623X, University of Göttingen) |
| Año | 2019 |
| Volumen | 166 |
| Páginas | 106432 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2019-12-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | Sí |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | Ecological Economics (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0921-8009 • E-ISSN: 1873-6106 |
| Editorial | Elsevier BV (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2019.106432 |
| OpenAlex | W2969438524 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Referencias citadas | 40 |
Agriculture · Aquifer · Arid · Business · Common-pool resource · Economic growth · Economics · Environmental economics · Environmental planning · Environmental resource management · Geography · Groundwater · Natural resource economics · Political science · Psychological intervention · Urbanization · Water resource management · Water resources · Computer Science · Engineering · Environmental Science · Flood Risk Assessment and Management · Psychology · Water Governance and Infrastructure · Water resources management and optimization · Ecology
Groundwater use for irrigation – a global inventory
Motivation Crowding Theory
Nonsustainable groundwater sustaining irrigation
The value-added of laboratory experiments for the study of institutions and common-pool resources
Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects
Beyond Markets and States
A Review of Design Principles for Community-based Natural Resource Management
Context matters to explain field experiments
Non-cooperative institutions for sustainable common pool resource management
Socio-ecological explanations for crowding-out effects from economic field experiments in southern Africa
The impact of culture and ecology on cooperation in a common-pool resource experiment
Incentives for cooperation
Local Environmental Control and Institutional Crowding-Out
Collective Action Dynamics under External Rewards
Playing games to save water
Measuring risk attitudes among Mozambican farmers
Behavioural Development Economics
Heterogeneity, Group Size and Collective Action
Aligning Key Concepts for Global Change Policy
Advancing the understanding of behavior in social-ecological systems
Games for groundwater governance
Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms
| Velocidad de citación | historical |
|---|---|
| Altamente citado | No |