Contracts for venture capital financing with double-sided moral hazard
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 14869035 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Hui Fu (0000-0001-7720-0463, Jiangnan University, corresponding author), Jun Yang (0000-0001-6740-4358, Acadia University), Yunbi An (University of Windsor, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2019 |
| Volume | 53 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 129-144 |
| Publication date | 2019-06-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Small Business Economics (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0921-898X • E-ISSN: 1573-0913 |
| Publisher | Springer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1007/s11187-018-0028-2 |
| OpenAlex | W2796265560 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 35 |
Business · Debt · Economics · Entrepreneurship · Equity (law · Incentive · Incomplete contracts · Internal financing · Investment (military · Microeconomics · Moral hazard · Social venture capital · Venture capital · Corporate Finance and Governance · Firm Innovation and Growth · Private Equity and Venture Capital · Finance
Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real World
Corporate Governance
Two-Person Cooperative Games
The Bargaining Problem
The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling
Why do contracts differ between venture capital types
The Nature of the Firm
The Theory of Corporate Finance
Fast growing small entrepreneurial firms and their venture capital backers
| Citations per year | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2024 - 2024 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |