Departures from Lichtenberg
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 14949483 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Rory Madden (0000-0002-2791-0747, Department of Philosophy UCL London, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2025 |
| Volume | 33 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 748-756 |
| Publication date | 2025-06-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | European Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0966-8373 • E-ISSN: 1468-0378 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/ejop.13040 |
| OpenAlex | W4410519180 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 7 |
Lichtenberg's remarks are a driving force of The Practical Self . On Gomes's interpretation, Lichtenberg is presenting a challenge to theoretical knowledge of one's cognitive agency. Gomes argues that this challenge is insuperable, thereby making room instead for faith in one's cognitive agency. I question both the interpretation of Lichtenberg and the insuperability of the challenge, before explaining why a challenge which is more usually read into Lichtenberg's remarks is problematic for Gomes's project. I close by sketching on Gomes's behalf a response to this challenge
Cognition · Epistemology · Faith · Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology
| Highly cited | No |
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