Doxastic Agent's Awareness

When performing actions, we can be aware of what we are doing in virtue of being the one doing it. Or, at the very least, we can be aware that we are doing something. While to an extent contested, this is nevertheless a familiar claim – that we can enjoy a so-called ‘agent's awareness’ and/or ‘sense of agency’ in acting on the world. For example, suppose that Sally is opening a jar. The thought is that she can be aware of opening the jar even if her eyes are closed, and arguably even if her fingers happen to be numb. Or in any case, her experience is different from how it would be if she passively watched things happen to her. She wouldn't be surprised to find the jar unscrewed once she opens her eyes – the jar is open because she opened it. And the thought isn't just that we can form beliefs about what we are doing. It is a claim about certain forms of conscious experience which can then ground our self-ascriptions. Standardly, philosophers have limited the scope of agent's awareness to intentional actions, or at the very least actions – as we might initially expect. In contrast, I argue here that agent's awareness also extends to beliefs. This is to broaden the framework to introduce doxastic agent's awareness: an agentive awareness of making up one's mind and keeping it made up with regards to one's beliefs. Such awareness is possible because our awareness of performing a given action can be more or less rich, and I will suggest that in performing certain mental actions we see ourselves as forming and sustaining our beliefs. For example, suppose that Julia deliberates about Smith. She weighs the pros and cons and makes up her mind, thus concluding that Smith is a bad politician. I want to say that in doing all this, Julia is aware of making up her mind and forming a belief. This is still to ground the relevant awareness in our performance of actions, but to argue that in this way our experience can also encompass an awareness of mental states. In order to grip onto its significance, I initially motivate doxastic agent's awareness as a way of accounting for our self-knowledge of belief, and in particular, our use of the so-called ‘transparency method’. I also offer independent arguments, and the thesis bears additional importance for the agent's awareness and sense of agency research programme. The paper proceeds as follows. In §1, I introduce the question of what warrants our self-ascriptions of belief. By way of a reply in §2, I start presenting the thesis on the table – that we have an agentive awareness of them. This prior awareness, I propose, grounds our self-ascriptions. In §3, I offer additional arguments that we can possess doxastic agent's awareness. I also want to clarify that my ultimate aim in this paper is to advocate relevant phenomenological and epistemic parities from the practical domain to that of belief. To a large extent, for example, I will assume that we at least sometimes have a distinctive form of experience when we act and which represents what we are doing. But ultimately, I would also be satisfied if the reader extended their preferred deflationary picture of agent's awareness to provide a similar account of doxastic agent's awareness. In what way do we learn of our beliefs? In this section I set out the question, what I take to be the most promising rough strategy, and several desiderata for a precise answer. I then introduce my picture of doxastic agent's awareness in §2 as way of providing a concrete account, and suggest that in deliberating and judging we have a prior awareness of our belief which warrants us in self-ascribing it. As such, this detour into self-knowledge highlights the broader significance of doxastic agent's awareness. Further, this section partly functions as an argument to the best explanation, although it cannot be complete since eliminating all the possibilities would take too much time given the lively nature of this debate. Let's start by saying something about the nature of belief. Belief is a standing state. For example, I believe that Barcelona is in Catalonia even when not considering the matter at all. The belief can be manifested in various ways: e.g., I provide it as an answer if someone queries Barcelona's location and I will visit Catalan websites when researching local traditions. But believing that Barcelona is in Catalonia is not itself something I do, or at least not in any straightforward sense.1 On the other hand, judgement is something like the event of sincerely endorsing a proposition, and is arguably also a (mental) action. Suppose I judge that Barcelona is in Catalonia. This is an occurrence which happens and then passes. And it is something I do. That said, belief and judgement do importantly relate (see e.g., Peacocke 1998: 90). Paradigmatically, judging that p is true is a way of coming to believe that p – I can deliberate on some issue, judge in conclusion that p is true and, standardly, come to believe that p. And I can change my beliefs by forming a different judgement on the issue. E.g., perhaps I initially judge that Barcelona is in Galicia and believe accordingly, before actually viewing a map and later concluding that Barcelona is in Catalonia and updating my belief in line with this. And judging that p can manifest one's standing belief that p. For the most part, if subjects believe that p, they will be disposed to judge that p. But I can also allow for cases where subjects aren't – instances of so-called ‘epistemic akrasia’. E.g., suppose Sally explicitly concludes that a friend likes her, but ever suspicious due to low self-esteem, she fails to act accordingly: she doesn't trust her friend with secrets, she seeks reassurance, and engages in suspicious questioning when her friend says they're busy etc. In this case, I am happy to say that Sally believes that her friend dislikes her despite the mismatch with what she judges to be true.2 Regarding the way in which we come to know our beliefs, an influential and plausible first pass is that we can use the so-called ‘transparency method’ (TM) first attributed to Evans (1982). Suppose you ask me whether I believe that it will rain. The thought is that I don't turn my attention inward via a detection mechanism that monitors my mental states or by considering evidence about myself such as my behaviour.3 Rather, I look outside and/or check the weather forecast. Suppose on this basis I conclude that it will rain. I can thereby tell you that I believe that it will rain. The question about what I believe is ‘transparent’ to a question about the outside world. This raises the question of how in fact self-ascriptions formed using TM are rational and knowledgeable. After all, employing TM involves transitioning from a proposition about one subject matter to a conclusion about something entirely different (namely, from the outside world to my own mental states). In the rest of this I several desiderata for our answer to this TM is not can be as in (see the don't deliberate I have thereby that p, my beliefs and I believe that Belief also be in an epistemic This would be to say that any for one belief would be to the from my belief that p, or my belief that I judge that p, as as my beliefs in relevant But this isn't the with for the grounds of our we wouldn't the from to believe that is one which rational to the subject It is not and one which in and self-ascriptions. After all, one's conclusion might be in various of one being at all aware of this. using the belief that I believe that p rational by the own For example, TM isn't on from one's own with from will to or even friend believes that it will TM is such that the conclusion makes sense to the and she that the belief for of such as and to this. they claim that one's is in virtue of – all, when we judge that p, at the very least we believe that p as this isn't to say that the subject this This also for that on to the subject can can see something like this in on the thought that employing TM and considering whether p is true is a way of making up our on the subject of p. In making up our like this, is because I assume that what I actually believe about can be made true my on that I have the to answer a question about my belief in a way that the And we are to this because it is a on in in the first is something about to prior about our to what we and my account will be in some way But not what an in this to itself is a to this The way of out this makes it like the it outside my – it is not a because the subject happens to have this isn't to say that she is at all aware of this TM forms of a broader as a and judging all to us in a to our beliefs, even when we set out to do we in a of and form a and then someone us what we believe on the this us in a to our conclusion as what we And it just as much as if someone us the question and not Or perhaps one actually to ask me this question, but I this I believe Suppose that I happen to the weather and conclude that it will rain. I just as to then the belief that it will if I as if I out from the start to answer a question about my mental I find account of TM She that judging that p when employing TM is an mental as of the broader intentional mental action of self-ascribing one's belief. As such, a belief with the just in making this The from to believe that isn't a at all. The is by a of awareness in performing this intentional mental action and the of belief to use the I have with this But the of TM will also in cases like the where we set out to learn of our beliefs. I have an in what way the question one in the to learn whether they believe that we might how judging that p one in this but the broader of and deliberating prior to the judgement also a introduce doxastic agent's awareness as a way of providing an answer. I first introduce the agent's awareness framework I then set out doxastic agent's awareness and how it might in fact be possible given that beliefs are not actions I by the question thus the importance before presenting arguments in awareness is a I will to have certain the opening in which Sally is aware of opening the jar. This just one of When I when I when I when I for the most part, I to be aware of what I am doing at least, to with in which I act being such as my someone me to or my on me several things about this awareness. That we sometimes have ‘agent's awareness’ of what we are doing is a claim at the of experience and It isn't that we form beliefs about what we are that we are aware of this in a epistemic This is like how I can be to be of my in virtue of believing that my is in of and also in a the grounds the we might that our awareness of acting and of what we are doing can as the grounds for self-ascribing And as with I will take it that the awareness be can have an experience as if a is in of you when it I allow that you can have an experience as of doing something but where you to do at all, e.g., in the of or where you in performing that action awareness in it involves an experience that you are doing something. experience this opening and on is something it is like to do something and to can this with being on or when things happen to a such as or someone their like a This is a – it is an awareness that you are doing something. can this experience of acting the sense of we also to an experience of doing one in Peacocke This would be a form of with the not just that you are doing but what it is that you are doing. Or it is a that you are doing something a of – e.g., you might just be aware of a and not the an agent's awareness of this is more the sense of but I can several in As Peacocke agent's awareness of this us to to a given action. I can to a as which to an awareness of the and not just that I am doing something this is awareness not to be aware of what we are up to in any given for example, about performing as of on the opening the and in a precise way to and not too what we are up to at in the But even we are acting we are not explicitly on and do we have beliefs about what we are doing. do a things when and it would too much to conscious beliefs at awareness also arguably extends to mental This warrants some time because it will me when my and also allow me to the of the agent's awareness actions and are things we do some our intentional we have agent's awareness at all, it plausible it would in this For example, on paper with doing in or a with it out The mental actions similar in certain relevant to their from our own The mental actions of and judgement in have in this For example, that thought a sense of And that we have an agent's awareness more of which grounds our that we are one thought in and Peacocke have that we have an agent's awareness of that we can have that us as making a despite the judgement and belief, still an agent's awareness of The to this agent's awareness of mental action and mental states is As she that when judging that p employing we the belief that p and are aware of this. But this is to in a to our agent's awareness in very And it is to be aware of self-ascribing one's belief, where this is a mental action of It is not to be aware of one's beliefs in a way that from one's agency in It be we wouldn't initially to the agent's awareness framework to belief. are standing believing is not an action we can or something we can be to do. our is something we do, as is But believing is not something we do, or at least not in the it is that my claim is that we have an agent's awareness of what we are but I don't want to a here on whether it involves agentive This would be to say that agentive is a form of which is to other of Peacocke and I that we have an agent's awareness that represents what we are doing and which also a sense of But one might this. we just have an awareness of what we are doing which to and/or For example, is to to in account of agent's awareness of and that it is that one's the we enjoy when performing This is to since I can to my own claim and one out this to And it is for this that I have about as to which would a more of this I do that doxastic awareness in In of the I that we do in fact sometimes possess an agent's awareness our beliefs. In particular, we have an agent's awareness of our beliefs in forming and sustaining or more in making our mind and keeping it made this is to be aware of our beliefs as beliefs, and not which we also happen to it sense to the agent's awareness framework in such a way from an awareness of action to also encompass mental The first is to say that we can have an agent's awareness of performing mental As I it is plausible to the framework in this The is to say that such actions an agentive our beliefs, and that they about the beliefs and/or as they Regarding the nature of this for the of this paper I just want to claim that we have some of say our beliefs via performing the relevant mental The is to say that awareness can be more or less are aware of one as For example, we can be aware of an as a And this states and things that – e.g., we can be aware of a as This also to action – we can be aware of a as on the And in being aware of our action in a I that we can also be aware of thereby about and sustaining a certain of being aware of the being on in virtue of on the and keeping it being aware of being in virtue of it and keeping it being aware of being in a in virtue of and the most for our this about awareness being more or less also extends to mental action. For example, we can be aware of performing mental as the I that in and judging that p, we are aware of mental actions in a that of forming and sustaining our beliefs making up our mind and keeping it made I this awareness in of some of On my account, the with making up one's mind are as to to the beliefs. As such, doxastic agent's awareness on mental I have that we have an agentive awareness of belief states and I have the significance of this. This might like a and that the on the table is not an agent's awareness of belief all, but just of mental actions in making up our is a sense in which this is And performing actions is to agency our beliefs, and the awareness is still in our agentive to states. I can still this claim even a account of epistemic agency I to judging that p one to have the belief that p, as that belief. might whether one have agent's awareness of a of an action. After all, even if I have agent's awareness of on the I still to use like to see if the is in fact And perhaps all I have is agent's awareness of and and not my belief But we can be aware of our actions of that to what would be a I can be aware of a as on the even are at my the and the I can be aware of the even my the to be on the In this I can be aware of certain – the and the on the – in them. It is not that I have to then also on the of And I that we can be aware of and judging as forming and our beliefs, even this is a are in this way aware of our beliefs, in virtue of to come about and I the scope and of my when we do have agent's awareness of our beliefs, it will be when we in conscious and or at least this will be the I don't want to say that we are aware in this way of our beliefs all the I can allow that beliefs can be formed that can be and even that we can in it in this sense this isn't to say that I myself – I the This is to for example, to claim that we in at all we see ourselves as thereby forming our beliefs. that sometimes we can deliberate about whether p is true that this our beliefs and that we might to in to I can this, but that will be a at the phenomenological such cases and the which the of we can be aware as of agency and making up our mind actually doing the awareness can be In this I allow that we can judge that p believing that p, and might even that we believe that p on this In using TM us and our is but not knowledgeable. This is like how a subject might that they are on a and have an awareness as if they doing when in fact that the the how a question about the world us in a to answer a question about our own mental our use of TM forms of a broader in to us in a to the beliefs. I can to doxastic agent's awareness. In deliberating and judging we are aware of forming and sustaining beliefs, making up our mind and keeping it made up with regards to our beliefs. have this awareness when employing and also other Suppose that Sally to know whether she believes that She the and and concludes that it will rain. this she can then tell the that she believes that it will rain. In deliberating and judging that it will she is aware of making up her mind about whether it will rain. In judging that it will she is thereby aware of forming a belief with that This awareness warrants her in self-ascribing the belief. about sometimes we might TM and in that form a belief for the first but deliberating E.g., suppose you ask Sally whether she believes that it will when the In this case, she doesn't to deliberate about the and can conclude that will I believe that it will In this case, I would say that in judging that p, Sally is aware of thereby making up her mind and forming the belief that p. what about when we use TM to beliefs we formed a E.g., suppose you ask Sally whether she believes that Smith is a and she happens to have that it is the for Sally judges that Smith is a and deliberating or forming the belief She can nevertheless the belief. in judging that Smith is a Sally is aware of keeping her mind made up with regards to p. She can the belief if be in of the like how I can be aware of a as something which I am doing and to have – I can up if The arguments are at the of my that our awareness is to making up our with regards to our beliefs and also that this awareness is agentive in In to the for example, one might to other forms of experience and in particular, forms of agentive For example, an account of TM belief a which we experience when judging that p and which warrants us in self-ascribing the belief that p. and argue that judging for a a distinctive But they this as a I have to the agent's awareness and to the reader of this can the with one in which we aren't aware of the of making up our such might be that of epistemic the subject judges that p but nevertheless believes that is – even if the subject can form a belief, it wouldn't be a standing belief that and the familiar in action subjects are aware of being in they would in with a very different to any that the would as a standing belief. In the would have a sense of This that is something distinctive about our experience in the case, the sense that we are in fact agency our beliefs. argument from the way in which actions can rational from their and the that action awareness in this. the in which I a in a or to To it to do and they like things to do. they sense from my own this with a I do something but which nevertheless to like if to very out of for my action to rational or to me in that I be aware of what I am doing. And I to be aware in a way that not This is because actions to me in that or at least they can do. not that I to explicitly on in order to out what I am doing and that is in fact to do it. this awareness would have to be to a relevant and to what I am doing a After all, in and of itself isn't what rational from my but in as in doing I am also on the can this to the mental actions in like a to do, even in the and from our own that is a to do. It is not just that our are rational and have something for as as we are in virtue of evidence in their And for to in this way action awareness the relevant of It wouldn't that way if of ourselves as forming a belief we ourselves as forming a judgement on the This is because beliefs, are standing states with out whether p is true is if it to This is the for deliberating about states of such as if my are – to just deliberating for the of it if our answer our and come the in cases such as forming a judgement on the matter wouldn't be a to do. for that we have doxastic agent's awareness is that for to to As as we are we don't have to do evidence in order to a belief, from in As such, about p and making up our mind at least to be one and the for For example, suppose I that a is in a and judge that the is – I will thereby believe that it is and to do And it like a as as I am This isn't to that other are at other of And is it to say that the will be in any one – it might take some time to whether p is in we are in the of making up our mind which we complete when we form our and which we to be aware As that this is even the in instances where that we form a belief and not a such as if about the any question in we would in to the claim is that about p and making up our mind at least to be the from our something in the of beliefs, would be to have what doxastic agent's awareness. that we have an agent's awareness and sense of agency our a doxastic agent's awareness. This is an awareness of forming and sustaining our beliefs in performing relevant mental actions, of making up our mind and keeping it made is and I that doxastic agent's awareness warrants self-ascriptions made using the This paper also bears significance for agent's awareness more such as if we are to the This will also relate to our preferred account of doxastic agency which I have on

Doxastic logic · Epistemology · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Free Will and Agency · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge · Philosophy · Psychology

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