Anscombe on the shallowness of consequentialism
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 14949520 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Craig Taylor (0000-0002-7186-2674, Flinders University Adelaide South Australia, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2025 |
| Volume | 33 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 737-747 |
| Publication date | 2025-06-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | European Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0966-8373 • E-ISSN: 1468-0378 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/ejop.12995 |
| OpenAlex | W4401019833 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 12 |
This paper is divided into two parts. In the first I outline and defend Elizabeth Anscombe's claim that consequentialism is a shallow philosophy by considering how two contemporary consequentialists reach opposing but equally outlandish moral conclusions on a matter as fundamental as whether it is good or bad that the human race continues. In the second I argue that in order to show what is wrong with the consequentialist arguments presented in part one, we need to deploy a wider range of critical resources than what typically appears in contemporary analytic moral philosophy. One example of a relevant and under‐appreciated resource I then consider is satire as a mode of moral thought
Consequentialism · Epistemology · Computer Science · Free Will and Agency · Philosophy · Space Science and Extraterrestrial Life · War, Ethics, and Justification
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |