Unsolvable Riddles and the Truth of Skepticism
Wittgenstein and Cavell
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 14949533 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Gilad Nir (0000-0002-9942-844X, Institut für Philosophie Universität Potsdam Potsdam Germany, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2025 |
| Volume | 33 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 1540-1556 |
| Publication date | 2025-12-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | European Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0966-8373 • E-ISSN: 1468-0378 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/ejop.13087 |
| OpenAlex | W4411743648 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 12 |
Both Wittgenstein and Cavell see riddles as a model of intellectual difficulty. By drawing attention to it, they remind us that not all of our intellectual challenges take the form of empirically answerable questions—there may be cases of our not merely lacking knowledge, but of being caught in the fantasy that a certain type of knowledge can be had. They further remind us what is involved in solving riddles, namely the transformation of our initial understanding of the problems. I argue that these insights guide Cavell's diagnosis of the problem of skepticism as the tragic expression of our modern human condition. In comparing the problem of skepticism to a riddle, Cavell proceeds to ask: If the skeptic's conjuring trick consists in leading us to treat an essential aspect of our life as a merely epistemological problem, what ulterior motive does this serve? Cavell here appeals to the Nietzschean idea that the skeptic's theoretical riddle serves to conceal that which it would be too painful to find out, namely the real, practical problem of our finitude and separateness. What is needed, in order to acknowledge the truth of skepticism and overcome it, is a radical transformation of the human
Epistemology · Skepticism · Logic, programming, and type systems · Philosophy · Samuel Beckett and Modernism · Wittgensteinian philosophy and applications
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |