Nietzsche's Conception of Skepticism as Intellectual Virtue and Vice

Bibliographic Data

ID14949550
AuthorsLorenzo Serini (0000-0003-3331-3401, Department of Philosophy, Social Sciences Building University of Warwick Coventry United Kingdom, corresponding author)
Year2025
Volume33
Issue4
Pages1466-1485
Publication date2025-12-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueEuropean Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0966-8373 • E-ISSN: 1468-0378
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/ejop.13068
OpenAlexW4409212691
LanguageEN
References cited23

Recent approaches are unable to make full sense of Nietzsche's distinction between weak and strong skepticism (BGE 208–209; A54). In this paper, I propose an alternative interpretation. My suggestion is that this distinction is best understood in the context of his virtue epistemology. My approach follows and extends Alfano's proposal to interpret Nietzsche as an inquiry responsibilist virtue epistemologist. However, I part ways with Alfano about the normative framework for Nietzsche's virtue epistemology. My contention is that Alfano's framework for Nietzschean virtue is unable to satisfactorily frame the distinction between strong and weak skepticism. In contrast, I offer an alternative framework that is better suited to interpreting Nietzsche's distinction and to articulating his conception of skepticism in terms of intellectual virtue and vice. I provide an account of Nietzsche's virtue/vice conception of skepticism that is currently lacking in the literature, and that is worthy of the attention of virtue epistemologists

Epistemology · Skepticism · Virtue · Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, and Hegel · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Philosophy, Ethics, and Existentialism · Psychology

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