Austere Relationalism and Seeing Aspects
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 14949562 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Paweł Jakub Zięba (0000-0001-6993-4555, Jagiellonian University Cracow, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2025 |
| Volume | 33 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 1117-1136 |
| Publication date | 2025-09-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | European Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0966-8373 • E-ISSN: 1468-0378 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/ejop.13059 |
| OpenAlex | W4408329612 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 53 |
Austere relationalism combines two claims. First, the phenomenal character of perception is at least partially constituted by the perceived items. Second, perception doesn't consist in representing the perceived items as being a certain way. Recently, Daniel Kalpokas, Avner Baz, and Søren Overgaard have cast doubt on the ability of austere relationalism to account for the peculiar phenomenology of aspect‐seeing. I show that this explanatory challenge can be met. Some of the claims made by the critics can be resisted, whereas other can be accommodated into austere relationalism. Most notably, I argue that austere relationalists should acknowledge that aspect‐seeing is enabled by unconscious perceptual judgment. This not only allows them to meet the challenge, but also provides the means to reconcile the apparently belief‐independent phenomenology of aspect‐seeing with the arguably indispensable role that concepts and recognition play in it
Epistemology · Action Observation and Synchronization · Embodied and Extended Cognition · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology
Reference and Consciousness
Perception and its Objects
The distinct modes of vision offered by feedforward and recurrent processing
Empirical support for higher-order theories of conscious awareness
Speed of processing in the human visual system
Mental Paint and Mental Latex
Towards a cognitive neuroscience of consciousness
Experimental and Theoretical Approaches to Conscious Processing
The Silences of the Senses
Naïve realism and seeing aspects
Do we see facts
Does Property-Perception Entail the Content View
The ins and outs of conscious belief
Seeing-as, seeing-o, and seeing-that
Unconscious perception and central coordinating agency
Consciousness and Content in Perception
Implicit attitudes and awareness
The transparency of experience and the neuroscience of attention
What the Disjunctivist is Right About
The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy and Implicit Cognition
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1 |
| Citation span | 2026 - 2026 (1) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |