The internal autonomy of the firm

Bibliographic Data

ID14970829
AuthorsDavid Wishart (0000-0003-2281-4745, Law School, La Trobe University, Melbourne, Australia, corresponding author), Ann Wardrop (Law School, La Trobe University, Melbourne, Australia), Marilyn Mcmahon (Law School, Deakin University, Melbourne, Australia)
Year2018
Volume27
Issue1
Pages131-156
Publication date2018-01-02
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueGriffith Law Review (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1038-3441 • E-ISSN: 1839-4205
PublisherInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/10383441.2018.1500077
OpenAlexW2885031986
LanguageEN
References cited18

Banks and financial institutions have been excoriated in recent years for having bad firm cultures. However, when faced with the prospect of regulation of the culture of their organisation, banks and financial institutions frequently claim that their internal organisation should be free from outside interference – that they should be autonomous. Government reports echo this claim. This article interrogates it. The article suggests that such claims rest on political liberalism, economic theory or legal impossibility. On examination, none of these bases survives as unassailable although they are conceded to have seized the debate. From this point, the essay moves to consider how the policy debate might be reconceived to make a more sophisticated discussion possible

Autonomy · Economics · Government (linguistics · Impossibility · Law and economics · Liberalism · Political science · Politics · Rest (music · Sociology · Banking stability, regulation, efficiency · Global Financial Regulation and Crises · Housing, Finance, and Neoliberalism · Law · Philosophy

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