The Ethnic Feud in Qing Taiwan

What is this Violence Business, Anyway? An Interpretation of the 1782 Zhang-Quan Xiedou

Bibliographic Data

ID15028008
AuthorsDavid Ownby (corresponding author)
Year1990
Volume11
Issue1
Pages75-98
Publication date1990-06-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueLate imperial China (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0884-3236 • E-ISSN: 1086-3257
PublisherProject MUSE (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1353/late.1990.0007
OpenAlexW2128157434
LanguageEN
Citations received4
References cited7

Vol. 11, No. 1 Late Imperial ChinaJune 1990 THE ETHNIC FEUD IN QING TAIWAN: WHAT IS THIS VIOLENCE BUSINESS, ANYWAY? AN INTERPRETATION OF THE 1782 ZHANG-QUAN XIEDOU David Ownby* Introduction At least 55 incidents of xiedou violence occurred in Taiwan between 1768 and 1888.1 As xiedou was a broad category of violence, these incidents varied in scope and nature, but their frequency suggests the severity of the social problem represented by such incidents.2 As a result, the xiedou on Taiwan has attracted considerable scholarly attention, concentrating chiefly on the ethnic, or "subethnic," nature of much of the xiedou conflict, the fact that most of this violence involved three fairly distinct ethnic groups—Quanzhouers, Zhangzhouers, and Hakkas—who had migrated from the Southeast Coast to form the core of the Taiwanese population.3 * The author would like to thank Tom Buoye, Timothy Cheek, Harry Lamley, James Wilkerson , and the readers and editors of Late Imperial China for their comments on this essay. 1 The actual number of incidents reported by scholars varies according to definition and diligence . See Chen 1989:95-97; Huang 1976:85-86; and Zhang 1970:35-43, for scholarly compilations of xiedou engagements. Kong 1985, critiques Huang and Zhang. I offer an English-language conflation of all of these efforts in Ownby 1989:356-368. 2 Although some scholars equate xiedou with the feud as described in the anthropological literature, in my own research I define it more broadly to include "any of a number of forms of collective violence in which armed groups contest with one another for access to a perceived good. The collectivities involved can be lineages, pseudo-lineages, surname associations , common-origin associations, subethnic communities, secret societies, or virtually any combination or variation of these groups. The conflict can have a variety of motives, from simple vengeance to looting and raiding ... The term xiedou, however, is never employed to refer to violence directed against the state." See Ownby 1989:78. 3 "Ethnicity" as used in this essay agrees in essence with the definition of Seymour-Smith 1986:95-96: The key features of this concept [ethnicity1 are the identification and labeling of any grouping or any category of people, and the explicit or implicit contrasts made between the identified group and another group or category. There must always be a we/they dichotomy to apply a concept of ethnicity. The features of labelling and contrast are dynamic, subject to contextual reinterpretation, and exist variously at different levels. Boundaries established by both labelling and contrast do not prohibit individuals from moving back and forth between respective groupings or categories, nor do they prohibit peoples from identifying or being identified differently as they move back and forth." The ethnic groups referred to in this essay include chiefly immigrants from Zhangzhou and Quanzhou, both of which are prefectures in southern Fujian province, and the Hakka people, who migrated from the inland, upland regions of southern Fujian and eastern Guangdong. For examinations of the cultural differences between these ethnic groups, see Lamley 1981:291-296, and Shi 1987. Late Imperial China 11, No. 1 (June 1990):75-98° by the Society for Qing Studies 75 76David Ownby This valuable research has correctly identified the structure of xiedou violence; indeed, the vast majority of xiedou incidents—and even a fair number of rebellions on Taiwan4 —were fought on ethnic lines. However , concentration on the ethnic nature of the conflict is perhaps less helpful in understanding the mechanisms by which xiedou began and spread, and the constituencies which benefited from xiedou. Evidence presented below suggests that in some cases, xiedou were not conscious strategic choices of ethnic communities, but instead grew out of routine, everyday conflicts. These routine conflicts mushroomed into larger, more destructive xiedou incidents at the instigation not of landlords, lineage elders , or temple leaders—stereotypical leaders of ethnic communities—but rather under the direction of local toughs and mercenaries who earned money and prestige for their participation in these "defensive" efforts. In addition, many of those organized by these local toughs to engage in xiedou violence belonged to an underclass with a limited sense of ethnic identity and loyalty. In the incident depicted

Archaeology · China · Criminology · Ethnic group · Feud · Payment · Political science · Population · Sociology · Zhàng · Chinese history and philosophy · Demography · History · Hong Kong and Taiwan Politics · Japanese History and Culture · Law · Philosophy

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