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Vertical or horizontal

Optimal integration strategy under separation of ownership and control

Bibliographic Data

ID15066797
AuthorsYang Yang (0000-0002-3705-7612, Southwestern University of Finance and Economics), Ling Yan (0000-0003-0533-3173, Southwestern University of Finance and Economics), Jing Gu (0000-0002-4035-9072, Sichuan University, corresponding author)
Year2023
Volume36
Issue1
Pages2233-2272
Publication date2023-03-31
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueEconomic Research-Ekonomska Istraživanja (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1331-677X • E-ISSN: 1848-9664
PublisherInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/1331677x.2022.2097104
OpenAlexW4285728477
LanguageEN
References cited80

This study proposes a framework to analyze the strategic value of integration, when separation of ownership and control is considered. According to this framework, we investigate the optimal integration strategy in different control distribution and discuss how external market influences the best strategic choice. Beside theoretical analysis, we also provide evidence from Chinese listed firms to validate our research. The key results of our study show that first, unintegrated strategy works best, if the level of control-ownership disparity is extremely high. Second, in general, vertical strategy is more appropriate for substitute markets, while horizontal strategy may bring more benefits in a highly complementary market. Third, the impact of integration strategy on a firm’s performance is negatively moderated by control-ownership disparity. However, this moderate effect may be weakened by market structure. Our results provide a new and comprehensive perspective for understanding the inconsistent results from previous studies. Moreover, the analysis in this study also highlights a firm’s strategic decision and market regulation policy

Business · Economics · Industrial organization · Management · Microeconomics · Vertical Integration · Banking stability, regulation, efficiency · Computer Science · Corporate Finance and Governance · Financial Markets and Investment Strategies · Marketing

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