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A New Solution to the Puzzle of Fifty-Fifty Split in Sharecropping

Bibliographic Data

ID15066823
AuthorsJiancai Pi (0000-0003-4327-8355, Nanjing University, corresponding author)
Year2013
Volume26
Issue2
Pages141-152
Publication date2013-01-01
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueEconomic Research-Ekonomska Istraživanja (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1331-677X • E-ISSN: 1848-9664
PublisherInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/1331677x.2013.11517612
OpenAlexW2171361185
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited11

This paper mainly discusses the puzzle of fifty-fifty split in sharecropping through an improved principal-agent moral hazard framework. Greatly different from the existing literature, this paper finds a new solution to the puzzle of fifty-fifty split in sharecropping. Equal division between the landowner and the tenant regardless of the land’s fertility is incentive compatible, and at the same time the landowner could lease out more fertile land to the relational tenant to improve his utility by using the right of priority. Although fifty-fifty split in sharecropping happens to be fair and comes to be taken for granted as a norm, it is an efficient contractual arrangement in essence

Agriculture · Archaeology · Business · Computer security · Economics · Geography · Incentive · Labour economics · Land tenure · Law and economics · Lease · Leasehold estate · Microeconomics · Moral hazard · Political science · Sharecropping · China's Socioeconomic Reforms and Governance · Computer Science · Demographic Trends and Gender Preferences · Land Rights and Reforms · Law · Philosophy · Finance

  • When contracts interact

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Citations per year1
Citation span2026 - 2026 (1)
Highly citedNo

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