Influence of shareholders’ support over mergers and acquisitions in US banks
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 15067587 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Marcos Vizcaíno-González (Universidade da Coruña), Marcos Vizcaíno‐González (0000-0002-5416-8285, Universidade da Coruña, corresponding author), Julio Navío-Marco (0000-0001-5163-9777, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales, Department of Business Administration, UNED – University of Distance Learning, Madrid, Spain) |
| Year | 2018 |
| Volume | 31 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 228-239 |
| Publication date | 2018-01-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Economic Research-Ekonomska Istraživanja (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1331-677X • E-ISSN: 1848-9664 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/1331677x.2018.1429296 |
| OpenAlex | W2790265509 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 56 |
Using data about the US banking industry, the study investigates how the support disclosed by funds in corporate meetings influences the success of the completion of mergers and acquisitions (M&A). The methodological approach relies on the use of instrumental variables with the generalised method of moments (GMM). The results indicate that the voting support exercises a negative influence over the success of M&A, validating the probable presence of agency-driven behaviour in explaining M&A completion, and indicating that low governance and activism inspires independent behaviour of managers, proceeding against the wishes, position or interests of shareholders. Considering that voting performance has been reported as a proxy for reputational harm, the results provide some understanding about how the success in M&A in the US banking industry may be related to reputational consequences infiltrated through voting decisions
Banking industry · Business · Corporate governance · Disapproval voting · Harm · Mergers and acquisitions · Political science · Politics · Proxy voting · Public relations · Shareholder · Sociology · Voting · Auditing, Earnings Management, Governance · Computer Science · Corporate Finance and Governance · Law · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies · Accounting · Finance · Marketing
| Citations per year | 0.17 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2020 - 2020 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |