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Combined monetary and fiscal policy

The Nash Equilibrium for the case of non-cooperative game

Bibliographic Data

ID15067752
AuthorsJoanna Stawska (0000-0001-6863-1210, University of Lodz, corresponding author), Maciej Malaczewski (0000-0001-7798-2581, University of Lodz), Agata Szymańska (0000-0001-5184-931X, University of Lodz)
Year2019
Volume32
Issue1
Pages3554-3569
Publication date2019-01-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueEconomic Research-Ekonomska Istraživanja (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1331-677X • E-ISSN: 1848-9664
PublisherInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/1331677x.2019.1669063
OpenAlexW2977779172
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited38

The importance of the central bank and the government conducting their policies has increased recently, with more attention being given to the effectiveness of policy mix. The non-cooperative models of the monetary and fiscal game are frequently employed to study interactions between both authorities. The models assume that the authorities take into account each other’s choices when making decisions. It is also important to remember when seeking equilibrium in the non-cooperative models that in the Nash Equilibrium (which is sought in this study) the parties try to come up with the best response to the opponent’s decision. The aim of the paper is to present the Nash Equilibrium in a non-cooperative game between the government and the central bank using a non-cooperative model of a fiscal-monetary game (a policy-mix MODEL). This study demonstrates that in the Nash Equilibrium in the model, the budget deficit and interest rate of an EU member state depend on the exogenous data (external to the model), such as inflation target, base inflation and the Maastricht deficit limit. This study is enhanced by an analysis of the government and central bank’s sensitivity to the deep parameters of economic variables

Economics · Equilibrium selection · Fiscal policy · Game theory · Macroeconomics · Microeconomics · Monetary economics · Monetary policy · Nash equilibrium · Policy mix · Price of stability · Repeated game · Economic theories and models · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy · Monetary Policy and Economic Impact

  • The central bank or the government – who really dictates the terms of the policy-mix cooperation in economies with an independent monetary policy

    Open Access•Joanna Stawska, Maciej Malaczewski et al.•Economic Research-Ekonomska…•2023

  • Non-Cooperative Games

    John F Nash, John Nash•Annals of Mathematics•1951

  • Reconceptualising the ‘policy mix’ for innovation

    Open Access•Kieron Flanagan, Elvira Uyarra et al.•Research Policy•2011

  • Monetary Policy Rules and Macroeconomic Stability

    Richard H Clarida, Richard Clarida et al.•The Quarterly Journal of Economics•2000

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    Open Access•John F Nash•Proceedings of the National…•1950

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    Open Access•Robert E Lucas•Carnegie-Rochester Conference…•1976

  • Accounting for monetary and fiscal policy effects in a simple dynamic general equilibrium model

    Open Access•Ming-Jen Chang, Ming‐Jen Chang et al.•Economic Research-Ekonomska…•2018

  • An Introduction to Applicable Game Theory

    Open Access•Robert V Gibbons, Robert Gibbons•The Journal of Economic…•1997

Unique citing works1
Citations per year0,33
Citation span2023 - 2023 (1)
Citation velocityhistorical
Highly citedNo
Citation typesNeutral: 1

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