Governance spending fixation as a tool for reform to improve institutions
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 15068348 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Eimantas Blažys (0000-0002-2927-8175, Faculty of Economics, Economic Policy Department, University of Vilnius, Vilnius, Lithuania, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2020 |
| Volume | 33 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 934-956 |
| Publication date | 2020-01-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Economic Research-Ekonomska Istraživanja (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1331-677X • E-ISSN: 1848-9664 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/1331677x.2019.1676282 |
| OpenAlex | W3015648917 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 43 |
There is a consensus in the scientific community that most often the main obstacle to development is the absence of good institutions, however, it is also widely recognised, that this idea is of little use without explanations on how they can be improved and made to self-sustain ‘good equilibrium’. Purpose of this article is to propose such an explanation together with a tool for reform that could potentially address this issue. For this purpose, literature review is conducted to explore links of institutions to economic growth in search for opportunity to have a positive effect to the system through means of reform. Such an opportunity is found exploring governance-corruption-economic growth connection, to exploit which, a simple method is proposed that involves only basic math. A matching exercise between governance spending variables and governance evaluation variables reveals both a best way to judge governance spending and a potential value for orientation that could be used for limiting misallocation of resources in countries with governance overspending. At first glance a modest find may have significant practical implications, as this value could be used as a tool for reform, application of which could be expected to have an effect in two complementary ways: pragmatic – inefficient use of resources could be limited by diverting them to other government sectors; and incentives based, which when looked at through a lens of literature on ‘New institutional Economics’ looks especially promising, as in essence it could potentially enable application of principle of free market in state governance for most of poorly governed post-socialist European countries
Business · Corporate governance · Environmental health · Political science · Process management · Corruption and Economic Development · Economic Growth and Development · Local Government Finance and Decentralization · Medicine · Public Administration · Finance
How does political instability affect economic growth?
Corruption and the composition of government expenditure
Governance Indicators
Why Nations Fail
Aggregating Governance Indicators
Political risk, institutions and foreign direct investment
Why Nations Fail
Evidence on corruption as an incentive for foreign direct investment
Corruption and Economic Growth
Corruption, institutions, and economic development
Corruption as a Drag on Development
Quality of governance, public spending on health and health status in Sub Saharan Africa
The impact of institutional quality on foreign direct investment inflows
Corruption and shadow economy in transition economies of European Union countries
Measuring Governance
Global Foreign Direct Investment Flows
Rent-seeking bureaucracies, inequality, and growth
Growth and Governance
Growth and Governance
Public spending and outcomes
Making sense of institutions as a factor shaping economic performance
| Highly cited | No |
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