Behavioural investigation of the impact of different types of CEOs on innovation in family firms
Moderating role of ownership divergence between cash flow rights and voting rights
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 15068372 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Sadeen Ghafoor (0000-0002-7392-8286, Dongbei University of Finance and Economics), Man Wang (0000-0002-5681-990X, Dongbei University of Finance and Economics), Shihua Chen (0000-0001-7766-8859, Dongbei University of Finance and Economics), Rao Zhang (0000-0001-8024-2496, Nanjing Agricultural University, corresponding author), Muhammad Zulfiqar (0000-0002-5615-1671, Sun Wah International Business School, Liaoning University, Shenyang, China) |
| Year | 2022 |
| Volume | 35 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 2906-2929 |
| Publication date | 2022-12-31 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Economic Research-Ekonomska Istraživanja (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1331-677X • E-ISSN: 1848-9664 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/1331677x.2021.1985569 |
| OpenAlex | W3207323031 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 69 |
In what way different types of CEOs within family firms, based on control diversity, behave towards R&D investment and how excess voting rights alter this behaviour of CEOs? This study has aimed to investigate the R&D investment behaviour of CEOs in family firms. This study has also investigated the moderating role of ownership divergence. The Pooled Ordinary Least Square (POLS) regression method is applied for data analysis purpose. Moreover, the Tobit regression model is also applied for robustness check. We obtained data (2008–2018) on Chinese A-share firms from CSMAR. The study found non-family CEOs exhibit negative behaviour towards R&D investment and that CEOs from family firms exhibit the same behaviour when do not have actual control rights. Family CEOs with actual control rights are more willing to R&D investment. The moderating effect of excess voting rights on family CEOs with actual control rights who change their willingness from positive to negative. The non-family CEOs and family CEOs without actual control rights show positive behaviour with existence of excess voting rights. This study is novel and pioneered the exploration of effects of different types of CEOs within family firms on R&D investment behaviour. This study is useful for directors to understand and select a suitable CEO for their firm, also for managers to devise an optimal level of ownership discrepancy to attain maximum benefits from R&D investment decisions
Business · Cash flow · Demographic economics · Econometrics · Economics · Microeconomics · Political science · Politics · Tobit model · Voting · Corporate Finance and Governance · Family Business Performance and Succession · Law · Working Capital and Financial Performance · Accounting
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| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |