Idealism and Yogacara Buddhism
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 15294152 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Saam Trivedi (Brooklyn College, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2005 |
| Volume | 15 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 231-246 |
| Publication date | 2005-11-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Asian Philosophy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0955-2367 • E-ISSN: 1469-2961 |
| Publisher | Routledge (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/09552360500285219 |
| OpenAlex | W1986891427 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 4 |
| References cited | 7 |
Over the last several years, there has been a growing controversy about whether Yogacara Buddhism can be said to be idealist in some sense, as used to be commonly thought by earlier scholars. In this paper, I first clarify the different senses of idealism that might be pertinent to the debate. I then focus on some of the works of Vasubandhu, limiting myself to his Vimsatika, Trimsika, and Trisvabhavanirdesa. I argue that classical Yogacara Buddhism, at least as found in these works of Vasubandhu, is closer to epistemic rather than metaphysical idealism or absolute idealism, as I understand these. However, there are undoubtedly some important differences between Vasubandhu's Yogacara and Western epistemic idealism that cast doubt on the idea that Yogacara is simply to be lumped together with Western epistemic idealism. Notes Notes [1] All of these are translated in Anacker (Citation1984). [2] Compare Willis (Citation1982, p. 59, n. 79): ‘... Yogacara's “conceptualization-only” (vijnaptimatra) theory...declares that ordinary cognitions do not actually “reach” outside objects. Rather they are just mental reflections, object-like mental images (vijnapti).’ [3] Compare Rahula (Citation1972, p. 118): ‘[Yogacara thinkers] ... were expounding the old teaching with their own new interpretations. ... Their contribution to Buddhism lay not in giving it a new philosophy but providing, in fascinatingly different ways, brilliant new interpretations and explanations of the old philosophy.’ [4] Compare Lusthaus (Citation1998b, p. 4): ‘Dualism is not the imagining of metaphysical objects opposed to metaphysical subjects. That is a linguistic embellishment, and, according to Sthiramati, comes later. The appearance of duality, Sthiramati says, is the rending apart of the sensorial act in such a way that eyes are given essential (svaruupa) existence apart from their apprehending visibles, and visibles are given essential (svaruupa) existence apart from eyes that envision them.’ [5] It is noteworthy that there are passages even in Asanga that cast doubt on the idea that classical Yogacara is metaphysically idealist. For instance, Asanga does not deny that rupa or matter is one of the five aggregates of the Buddhist notion of the self, nor does he reduce it to something purely mental as an idealist might do. See Asanga (Citation2001, p. 1ff.). [6] Many thanks to Jay Garfield for prompt and detailed comments and discussion via email on an earlier version of this paper, despite our disagreements. His vigorous opposition has greatly enriched this paper
Buddhism · Conceptualization · Dualism · Empiricism · Epistemology · Idealism · Metaphysics · Object (grammar · Theology · Indian and Buddhist Studies · Medieval and Classical Philosophy · Philosophy · Wittgensteinian philosophy and applications
| Citations per year | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2022 - 2026 (5) |
| Highly cited | No |