Developing a Dynamic Supervision Mechanism to Improve Construction Safety Investment Supervision Efficiency in China
Theoretical Simulation of Evolutionary Game Process
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 15460433 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Shitao Gong (0000-0002-5412-4848, Tongji University), Xin Gao (0000-0002-0937-6288, Tongji University), Li Zhou (0000-0001-7132-5935, Tongji University, corresponding author), Zhou Li (0000-0002-5702-2206, Tongji University), Linyan Chen (0000-0002-3843-2664, Tongji University) |
| Year | 2021 |
| Volume | 18 |
| Issue | 7 |
| Pages | 3594-3594 |
| Publication date | 2021-03-30 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1661-7827 • E-ISSN: 1660-4601 |
| Publisher | Multidisciplinary Digital Publishing Institute (PUBLISHER • CH) |
| DOI | 10.3390/ijerph18073594 |
| PMID | 33808439 |
| OpenAlex | W3142778666 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 58 |
The construction industry suffers from poor safety performance caused by the joint effect of insufficient safety investment by contractors and inefficient safety supervision by the government because of the information gap between the two sides. The present study aims to put forward a new pathway to improve safety investment supervision efficiency and analyze the decision-making interactions of stakeholders under this new pathway. For this purpose, this study establishes a safety investment information system to eliminate the information gap between the government and contractors for construction projects in China and further develops a dynamic safety investment supervision mechanism based on this. Evolutionary game theory is used to describe the decision-making interactions among stakeholders under the current static supervision mechanism and the dynamic supervision mechanism proposed in this research. Moreover, system dynamics is adopted to simulate the evolutionary game process and analyze the supervision effect and equilibrium state of different supervision mechanisms. The results reveal that the proposed safety investment information system could facilitate the transition of the supervision mode from static to dynamic; the evolutionarily stable strategy does not exist in the current static penalty scenario; and the dynamic supervision mechanism that correlates penalties with contractors' unlawful behavior probability can restrain the fluctuation of the evolutionary game model effectively and the players' strategy choices gradually stabilize in the equilibrium state. The results validate the effectiveness of the proposed dynamic supervision mechanism in improving supervision efficiency. This study not only contributes to the literature on safety supervision policy-making but also helps to improve supervision efficiency in practice
Business · China · Economics · Game theory · Industrial organization · Investment (military · Mechanism (biology · Microeconomics · Political science · Process (computing · Process management · Risk analysis (engineering · Computer Science · Construction Project Management and Performance · Occupational Health and Safety Research · Supply Chain Resilience and Risk Management
| Citations per year | 0.2 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2021 - 2021 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |