Skip to main content

ETHNOS_APP

Home • Search • Journals • List 0

An Evolutionary Game Model for Industrial Pollution Management under Two Punishment Mechanisms

Bibliographic Data

ID15466846
AuthorsChuansheng Wang (0000-0003-4340-7831, Capital University of Economics and Business), F G Shi (0000-0002-0030-988X, Capital University of Economics and Business, corresponding author)
Year2019
Volume16
Issue15
Pages2775-2775
Publication date2019-08-03
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueInternational Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1661-7827 • E-ISSN: 1660-4601
PublisherMultidisciplinary Digital Publishing Institute (PUBLISHER • CH)
DOI10.3390/ijerph16152775
PMID31382549
OpenAlexW2966090533
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited5

In recent years, with the rapid development of the economy, industrial pollution problems have become more and more serious. This paper constructs an evolutionary game model for industrial pollution between the local governments and enterprises to study the dynamic evolution path of a game system and the evolutionary stable strategy under two punishment mechanisms. The results show that, in a static punishment mechanism (SPM), the strategy between governments and enterprises is uncertain. Moreover, the evolutionary trajectory between governments and enterprises is uncertain. However, under the dynamic punishment mechanism (DPM), the evolution path between governments and enterprises tends to converge to a stable value. Thus, the DPM is more conducive than the SPM for industrial pollution control

Biology · Business · Economic system · Economics · Environmental pollution · Environmental protection · Evolutionarily stable strategy · Game theory · Industrial pollution · Mechanism (biology · Microeconomics · Path (computing · Punishment (psychology · Trajectory · Climate Change Policy and Economics · Computer Science · Energy, Environment, and Transportation Policies · Energy, Environment, Economic Growth · Environmental Science · Psychology · Social Psychology · Ecology · Pollution

  • Environmental Governance Cooperative Behavior among Enterprises with Reputation Effect Based on Complex Networks Evolutionary Game Model

    Open Access•Ming Luo, Ruguo Fan et al.•International Journal of…•2020

  • Implementation of a Multi-Agent Carbon Emission Reduction Strategy under the Chinese Dual Governance System

    Open Access•Wenke Wang, Xiaoqiong You et al.•International Journal of…•2020

  • Evolution and the Theory of Games

    John Maynard Smith•Did Darwin Get It Right?•1988

  • Evolutionary Games in Economics

    Daniel Friedman•Econometrica•1991

  • Firm incentives to promote technological change in pollution control

    Open Access•Scott Milliman, Scott R Milliman et al.•Journal of Environmental…•1989

  • Evolution and the Theory of Games

    Open Access•John Maynard Smith•Evolution and the Theory of Games•1982

  • Evolutionary game and simulation of management strategies of fallow cultivated land

    Open Access•Hualin Xie, Wei Wang et al.•Land Use Policy•2018

Unique citing works2
Citations per year0,33
Citation span2020 - 2020 (1)
Citation velocityhistorical
Highly citedNo
Citation typesNeutral: 2

Tools

Open DOISci-HubOpen Access
Ethnos_APP • Open Source Project • MIT License • Frontend v2.0.0 • Privacy and Cookies • API Documentation: api.ethnos.app/docs • API Source Code: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17049435 • Frontend Source Code: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17050053 • cruz.rio.br • Expectantes Misericordiae