Effects of a Mixed Emissions Control Policy on the Manufacturer’s Production and Carbon Abatement Investment Decisions
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 15501014 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Fei Wang (0000-0003-0860-6317, National Tax Institute of STA, Yangzhou 225007, China), Wang Fei (0000-0002-8275-0256), Dalin Zhang (0000-0002-5869-6544, Aalborg University, autor correspondente) |
| Ano | 2022 |
| Volume | 19 |
| Fascículo | 20 |
| Páginas | 13472-13472 |
| Data de publicação | 2022-10-18 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sim |
| Open Access | Sim |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Periódico | International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores do periódico | ISSN: 1661-7827 • E-ISSN: 1660-4601 |
| Editora | Multidisciplinary Digital Publishing Institute (PUBLISHER • CH) |
| DOI | 10.3390/ijerph192013472 |
| PMID | 36294049 |
| OpenAlex | W4306742758 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citações recebidas | 1 |
| Referências citadas | 35 |
Considering the consumers' environmental awareness, a mixed emissions control policy with carbon tax and a dynamic reward-punishment mechanism for carbon abatements was introduced to explore the manufacturer's low-carbon production issues. The results showed that: (1) Under a given mixed emissions control policy, a higher government pre-determined abatement target cannot positively encourage manufacturers' carbon abatement behaviors. However, a stricter emissions control policy is environmentally beneficial only when the government pre-determined abatement target exceeds a certain threshold. (2) Reducing the carbon abatement cost and enhancing the consumers' environmental awareness would always benefit manufacturers' low-carbon production, but both approaches benefit the environment only when the government pre-determined abatement target is below a certain threshold. (3) Under a mixed emissions control policy of social welfare maximization, the reward-punishment coefficient positively correlates with the government's optimal pre-determined abatement target, and the effect of the carbon tax rate on that is closely related to the carbon emissions of the unit product. More importantly, imposing a carbon tax or raising the tax rate and adopting a reward-punishment mechanism or raising the reward-punishment coefficient can effectively encourage manufacturers' carbon abatement investment behaviors. However, they have nothing but a negative effect on manufacturers' excessive abatement levels
Business · Carbon tax · Control (management · Economics · Emissions trading · Environmental economics · Government (linguistics · Greenhouse gas · Investment (military · Microeconomics · Natural resource economics · Production (economics · Public economics · Punishment (psychology · Energy, Environment, and Transportation Policies · Environmental Sustainability in Business · Sustainable Supply Chain Management · Ecology
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| Obras citantes distintas | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citações por ano | 0,33 |
| Intervalo de citações | 2023 - 2023 (1) |
| Velocidade de citação | historical |
| Altamente citado | Não |
| Tipos de citação | Neutras: 1 |