Does the “Miracle Drug” of Environmental Governance Really Improve Air Quality? Evidence from China’s System of Central Environmental Protection Inspections
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 15507649 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Ruxin Wu (Central South University, corresponding author), Piao Hu (0000-0002-1816-4893, Central South University) |
| Year | 2019 |
| Volume | 16 |
| Issue | 5 |
| Pages | 850-850 |
| Publication date | 2019-03-08 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1661-7827 • E-ISSN: 1660-4601 |
| Publisher | Multidisciplinary Digital Publishing Institute (PUBLISHER • CH) |
| DOI | 10.3390/ijerph16050850 |
| PMID | 30857188 |
| OpenAlex | W2921561642 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 17 |
| References cited | 20 |
Central environmental protection inspections have completed their goal of full coverage of 31 provinces in China, and more than 17,000 officials have been held accountable. The media has evaluated the effectiveness of central environmental protection inspections using the notions of "instant results" and the "miracle drug of environmental governance." Can this approach effectively promote local environmental governance? This paper takes the treatment effect of central environmental protection inspections on air pollution as an example. Using the method of regression discontinuity, central environmental protection inspections are found to have a positive effect on the air quality index (AQI), but this effect is only short term and unsustainable. Additionally, there are inter-provincial differences. Judging from the research results on sub-contaminants, the treatment effect of central environmental protection inspections on air pollution is mainly reflected in PM 10 , PM 2.5 and CO. Under the current situation in which PM 10 and PM 2.5 are the main assessment indexes, this phenomenon indicates that due to the political achievements and promotion of local officials and for reasons of accountability, it is more effective for the central government to conduct specific environmental assessments through local governments than to conduct central environmental protection inspections
Business · China · Corporate governance · Environmental governance · Environmental health · Environmental planning · Environmental protection · Environmental quality · Environmental resource management · Miracle · Political science · Quality (philosophy · Climate Change Policy and Economics · Energy, Environment, Economic Growth · Environmental Science · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth · Law · Medicine · Finance
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| Citations per year | 2.83 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2020 - 2026 (7) |
| Highly cited | No |