Environmental Regulation Competition and Carbon Emissions

Datos Bibliográficos

ID15510293
AutoresLizhi Cui (0009-0005-6844-1077, Anhui University of Technology, autor de correspondencia), Ding Yining (Anhui University of Technology), Yining Ding (0000-0002-9245-0863, Anhui University of Technology), Xiangqian Li (0000-0001-7281-9371, Anhui University of Technology)
Año2022
Volumen20
Número1
Páginas736-736
Fecha de publicación2022-12-30
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaInternational Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 1661-7827 • E-ISSN: 1660-4601
EditorialMultidisciplinary Digital Publishing Institute (PUBLISHER • CH)
DOI10.3390/ijerph20010736
PMID36613054
OpenAlexW4313471921
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas3
Referencias citadas17

To clarify the relationship between environmental regulatory competition and carbon emissions and provide a theoretical basis for carbon emission reduction governance, this paper explores the strategic interaction behavior of environmental regulatory competition by constructing a three-way evolutionary game model based on the perspective of the fusion of environmental federalism and local government competition theory. On this basis, the specific forms of carbon emission reduction competition are tested using the spatial Durbin model, and the mechanism of the effect of environmental regulation competition on carbon emissions is analyzed. The evolutionary game model shows that local governments make strategic choices based on the costs and benefits of environmental regulation, and there are strategic equilibria of "race to the bottom", "race to the top", and "differentiation of competition". The empirical results show that the competition for environmental regulations as a whole after the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China is a "race to the top", and the increase in the intensity of environmental regulations has an inhibitory effect on carbon emissions, which remains valid after a series of robustness tests. There is heterogeneity in environmental regulatory competition, and the effect of emissions reduction is most obvious in the central region. Mechanism analysis shows that environmental regulatory competition affects carbon emissions mainly through the effect of political performance assessment, the effect of industrial structure optimization, and the effect of low-carbon technology capability improvement. Therefore, the central government should follow the local government interest function and balance the interests of all parties, appropriately increase the proportion of environmental performance assessment and optimize the performance assessment system, and consider regional development differences to find the right carbon emissions reduction path

Biology · Business · Competition (biology · Corporate governance · Economics · Environmental governance · Industrial organization · Microeconomics · Natural resource economics · Race to the bottom · Race to the Top · Climate Change Policy and Economics · Energy, Environment, and Transportation Policies · Energy, Environment, Economic Growth · Ecology