Who Drives Green Innovation? A Game Theoretical Analysis of a Closed-Loop Supply Chain under Different Power Structures
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 15515382 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Dooho Lee (0000-0002-5494-4096, Kangwon National University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2020 |
| Volume | 17 |
| Issue | 7 |
| Pages | 2274-2274 |
| Publication date | 2020-03-27 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1661-7827 • E-ISSN: 1660-4601 |
| Publisher | Multidisciplinary Digital Publishing Institute (PUBLISHER • CH) |
| DOI | 10.3390/ijerph17072274 |
| PMID | 32230984 |
| OpenAlex | W3013600627 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
| References cited | 51 |
As awareness of environmental protection increases worldwide, enterprises have been building their supply chains in ways that conserve natural resources and minimize the creation of pollutants. One of the practical ways to make supply chains more sustainable is for enterprises to utilize green innovation strategies and to increase resource reuse. In this work, we focus on a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) consisting of a manufacturer, a retailer, and a collector. In the investigated CLSC, the manufacturer and the retailer drive the green innovation strategy either individually or simultaneously to boost market demand. In the reverse flow of the CLSC, the collector is responsible for collecting consumers' used products and transferring them to the manufacturer for remanufacturing. By combining two types of the market leadership and three types of green innovation strategies, we establish six different Stackelberg game models and solve them analytically. Through an extensive comparative analysis, we show who should have market leadership and who should drive the green innovation strategy in the CLSC. Various numerical examples are also given to support our major findings. One of our key findings suggests that the supply chain members must participate in green innovation activities at the same time to achieve a win-win scenario in the CLSC
Business · Closed loop · Economics · Environmental economics · Game theory · Industrial organization · Manufacturing engineering · Microeconomics · Remanufacturing · Resource (disambiguation · Reuse · Reverse Logistics · Stackelberg competition · Supply chain · Computer Science · Environmental Sustainability in Business · Sustainable Industrial Ecology · Sustainable Supply Chain Management · Marketing
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An evolutionary game-theoretic approach to analysis the green innovation chain dynamics under government policies
Perceived Greenwashing
Determinants of environmental innovation in US manufacturing industries
Environmental technologies and competitive advantage
Carbon Emission Reduction with Capital Constraint under Greening Financing and Cost Sharing Contract
Do Consumer’s Green Preference and the Reference Price Effect Improve Green Innovation? A Theoretical Model Using the Food Supply Chain as a Case
Fair but Risky? Recycle Pricing Strategies in Closed-Loop Supply Chains
Vertical Integration and Antitrust Policy
Toward a New Conception of the Environment-Competitiveness Relationship
| Citations per year | 0.75 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2022 - 2024 (3) |
| Highly cited | No |