The Computational Anatomy of Psychosis

Datos Bibliográficos

ID15519986
AutoresRick A Adams (0000-0002-7661-8881, University College London, autor de correspondencia), Klaas Ε Stephan (0000-0002-8594-9092, University College London), Harriet R Brown (University College London), Chris Frith (0000-0002-8665-0690, University College London), Karl J Friston (0000-0001-7984-8909, University College London)
Año2013
Volumen4
Fecha de publicación2013-01-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaFrontiers in Psychiatry (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 1664-0640 • E-ISSN: 1664-0640
EditorialFrontiers Media (PUBLISHER • CH)
DOI10.3389/fpsyt.2013.00047
PMID23750138
PMCIDPMC3667557
OpenAlexW2140487181
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas62
Referencias citadas15

This paper considers psychotic symptoms in terms of false inferences or beliefs. It is based on the notion that the brain is an inference machine that actively constructs hypotheses to explain or predict its sensations. This perspective provides a normative (Bayes-optimal) account of action and perception that emphasizes probabilistic representations; in particular, the confidence or precision of beliefs about the world. We will consider hallucinosis, abnormal eye movements, sensory attenuation deficits, catatonia, and delusions as various expressions of the same core pathology: namely, an aberrant encoding of precision. From a cognitive perspective, this represents a pernicious failure of metacognition (beliefs about beliefs) that can confound perceptual inference. In the embodied setting of active (Bayesian) inference, it can lead to behaviors that are paradoxically more accurate than Bayes-optimal behavior. Crucially, this normative account is accompanied by a neuronally plausible process theory based upon hierarchical predictive coding. In predictive coding, precision is thought to be encoded by the post-synaptic gain of neurons reporting prediction error. This suggests that both pervasive trait abnormalities and florid failures of inference in the psychotic state can be linked to factors controlling post-synaptic gain -such as NMDA receptor function and (dopaminergic) neuromodulation. We illustrate these points using biologically plausible simulations of perceptual synthesis, smooth pursuit eye movements and attribution of agency -that all use the same predictive coding scheme and pathology: namely, a reduction in the precision of prior beliefs, relative to sensory evidence

Bayes' theorem · Bayesian inference · Bayesian probability · Cognition · Cognitive psychology · Inference · Normative · Perception · Computer Science · Mental Health and Psychiatry · Neural dynamics and brain function · Neuroscience · Psychology · Schizophrenia research and treatment · Artificial Intelligence