A Lost Game of Bank Bargains

West Germany and International Banking Regulation between Bretton Woods and Basel I (1972–1988)

Bibliographic Data

ID16477461
AuthorsMatthias Kemmerer (0000-0002-4246-4490, Abt. Unternehmensgeschichte, University of Stuttgart , Azenbergstraße 12 , Stuttgart , Germany, corresponding author)
Year2023
Volume64
Issue2
Pages339-375
Publication date2023-11-25
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueJahrbuch für Wirtschaftsgeschichte / Economic History Yearbook (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0075-2800 • E-ISSN: 2196-6842
PublisherWalter de Gruyter GmbH (PUBLISHER • DE)
DOI10.1515/jbwg-2023-0013
OpenAlexW4388342250
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited3

Current theories of financial regulation suggest expanding rules-based formal state intervention to promote international banking stability. Such policy solutions should then be global in scope. This article instead argues that principles-based informal co- and self-regulation through domestic (gentlemen’s) agreements underpinned West German bank internationalisation until the 1980s. The analytic narrative approach allows the tracing of the social dynamics of the German politics of regulation, drawing on unused primary sources: Coalitions between the German regulating and regulated actors were bolstered by a liberal domestic framework and bespoke national policies. In contrast, regulatory harmonisation through international prudential standards came with high domestic adjustment costs for the German banking sector. Thus, domestic makeshift solutions to deal with and internalise cross-border financial risks proved most workable

Business · Economics · Financial regulation · Financial system · German · International banking · International economics · International trade · Internationalization · Political science · Politics · Scope (computer science · State (computer science · Global Financial Regulation and Crises · Law · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies

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