J. Lawton Collins, John Foster Dulles, and the Eisenhower Administration's "Point of No Return" in Vietnam
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 16529520 |
|---|---|
| Authors | David L Anderson (0000-0001-5061-0008, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1988 |
| Volume | 12 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 127-148 |
| Publication date | 1988-04-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Diplomatic History (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0145-2096 • E-ISSN: 1467-7709 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1467-7709.1988.tb00468.x |
| OpenAlex | W2090069822 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 4 |
| References cited | 7 |
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles met Prime Minister Ngo Dinh Diem for the first time in Saigon on 28 February 1955. Proclaiming his admiration for Diem's leadership of “Free Vietnam,” Dulles assured the South Vietnamese leader that he had the “solid support” of the United States.1 Less than a month later, General J. Lawton Collins, President Dwight D. Eisenhower's special representative in Saigon with full authority to speak on behalf of the U.S. government, was threatening Diem with the withdrawal of American support. “I thought we felt when I was in Saigon,” Dulles protested to Collins, “that the decision to back Diem had gone to the point of no return and that either he had to succeed or else the whole business would be a failure.”2 Collins did not agree that Diem was indispensable to the creation of a successful, non-Communist regime in Vietnam, and throughout April 1955 the Collins and Dulles positions contended within the administration. Collins came very close to prevailing, but, at virtually the last possible moment, Washington decided to support wholeheartedly the ill-fated prime minister as the best hope for a Vietnamese nationalist alternative to Ho Chi Minh and for the containment of communism in Southeast Asia. By the middle of May, Dulles had won, and the American partnership with Diem began its ultimately futile and tragic odyssey
Administration (probate law · Ancient history · Communism · Economic history · Nationalism · Political science · Politics · State (computer science · Theology · Vietnam War · Vietnamese · History · Law · Philosophy · Vietnamese History and Culture Studies
| Unique citing works | 4 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,12 |
| Citation span | 1992 - 1995 (4) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 4 |