A (Dubious) Conspiracy Theory of the 1967 War

The origins of the June 1967 Arab-Israeli war have been a source of discussion and varying interpretations since the event itself. Although there was no dearth of warlike rhetoric from Arab states including Egypt in the 1960s, even particularly in 1966, there was little reason to believe that Gamal Abdel Nasser actually planned to go to war at that time. In inter-Arab discussions, he repeatedly expressed the position that neither Egypt nor the Arab states were prepared for a third round against Israel.1 Syria, on the other hand, was far more militant, and following the ascension to power of the left wing of the Ba’ath party in Damascus in February 1966, Syrian belligerency became even more pronounced, possibly to shore up the unpopular minority Alawi regime by turning domestic sentiment toward an exterior threat and enemy: Israel. Indeed, specialists of the Arab world tend to attribute the beginning of the crisis that led to the 1967 war to the major tensions and skirmishes on, and Palestinian incursions from, the Syrian border with Israel.2 All these culminated in the 7 April 1967 ground and air battle between Israel and Syria in the area of the Sea of Galilee and Golan Heights. Given the strong warnings to Damascus issued by various Israeli spokesmen, including the chief of intelligence and the chief of staff, in the aftermath of that battle, tensions rose to a still higher level. Adding to the concerns of the period was the fact that some months before, in November 1966, Egypt had signed a mutual defense pact with Syria, presumably to bolster the confidence of the new regime in Damascus but also to deter Israel from moving against Syria

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