Limited Accommodation, Perpetuated Conflict
Kennedy, China, and the Laos Crisis, 1961-1963
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 16530713 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Noam Kochavi (Hebrew College, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2002 |
| Volume | 26 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 95-135 |
| Publication date | 2002-01-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Diplomatic History (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0145-2096 • E-ISSN: 1467-7709 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/1467-7709.00301 |
| OpenAlex | W2039992898 |
| Language | EN |
The United States and China conducted an important relationship during the Kennedy years. The China factor figured significantly in Kennedy's halting progress toward détente with the Soviet Union, in his quest for a nuclear test ban, and in his handling of the Vietnam issue. As well, the notion of a critical contest with the Chinese over Third World allegiances both fueled and colored official interest in the Asian-African arena.1 For its part, Beijing's perception that the United States was behaving in an imperious fashion reinforced Mao's hawkish predilections. In addition, Beijing almost certainly welcomed the opportunity to use friction with Washington to divert domestic attention away from the economic catastrophes that had befallen the country.2 No full-length study, however, has made the Kennedy administration's China policy its principal focus. The web of rashomonesque reminiscences and sharply competing interpretations surrounding Kennedy's performance enhances the value of inquiry into this topic. The writing on Washington's encounter with Beijing has mirrored the familiar pattern of Kennedy historiography. As historian Nancy B. Tucker notes, early eulogizers of John F. Kennedy's Camelot insisted that had the young president lived, he would have repaired relations with China in his second term.3 This corresponded to the picture of an open-minded Kennedy who had proven himself extremely capable of “growing,” learning from the recurring crises he experienced and steering toward a more conciliatory stance in the handling of the Cold War.4 A later school of historians conversely posits a president who was more inclined to obsession than growth, in the China sphere as elsewhere. According to Thomas G. Paterson, Warren I. Cohen, James Fetzer, and particularly Gordon Chang, Kennedy rigidly “believed the Chinese to be fanatics and feared the atomic bomb that they were in the process of developing.” To their mind, Kennedy manifested an action-prone quest for victory imbued with ethnocentricity and insensitive to the limits of American power.5 Thus, utilizing newly available evidence to review Kennedy's China record may shed light on Kennedy's overall performance as president
Beijing · China · CONTEST · Economic history · Political economy · Political science · Sociology · American Political and Social Dynamics · Communism, Protests, Social Movements · History · Law · Vietnamese History and Culture Studies
| Highly cited | No |
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