A Review of Congressional Mandating Behavior Since the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act

Bibliographic Data

ID16810769
AuthorsJanet M Kelly (Cleveland State University, corresponding author)
Year2004
Volume32
Issue2
Pages248-276
Publication date2004-06-01
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePolitics & Policy (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1555-5623 • E-ISSN: 1747-1346
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/j.1747-1346.2004.tb00184.x
OpenAlexW2015071082
LanguageEN
References cited20

Title 1 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA) of 1995 discourages Congress from considering a reported bill containing intergovernmental mandates without a Congressional Budget Office (CBO) cost statement and prohibits floor consideration of a bill that would impose new mandates costing more than the statutory threshold unless the legislation provides new spending authority or authorizes appropriations to cover the costs. A member must raise a point of order to enforce these rules, and in the House a simple majority can vote to consider the bill. Since cost estimates for bills are routine and the procedural safeguard is weak, it is a challenge to explain why Congress has enacted relatively few unfunded mandates since UMRA. This article reviews the circumstances that put unfunded mandates on the congressional agenda and examines congressional mandating behavior after UMRA

Activity-based costing · Business · Economics · House of Representatives · Law and economics · Legislation · Legislature · Political science · Reform Act · Repeal · Statutory law · Unfunded mandate · American Constitutional Law and Politics · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Law · Political Theory and Influence · Public Administration · Accounting · Finance

Tools

Open DOISci-Hub