Skip to main content

ETHNOS_APP

Home • Search • Journals • List 0

Carbon Markets

Rehabilitationg the Egalitarian Objection

Bibliographic Data

ID16824847
AuthorsAntoine Verret-Hamelin (Université Laval, corresponding author)
Year2019
Volume17
Issue3
Pages389-408
Publication date2019-10-25
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
Venueethic@ - An international Journal for Moral Philosophy (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1677-2954 • E-ISSN: 1677-2954
PublisherUniversidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.5007/1677-2954.2018v17n3p389
OpenAlexW2981329108
LanguageEN
References cited10

While carbon markets have been increasingly scrutinized for their moral merits, the egalitarian critique of carbon markets has been largely neglected. Many admit that emission-trading schemes (ETSs), in their actual form, reproduce pre-existing inequalities. However, this is often seen as a contingent, easily-fixed problem, as carbon markets can fulfill egalitarian goals as long as the initial allocation of permits is made according to an egalitarian ideal. The goal of this paper is to challenge this idealistic rejection of the egalitarian critique of carbon markets by underlying seven structural features of carbon markets that explain why, in all likelihood, ETSs will always reproduce pre-existing inequalities (without even curbing carbonemissions). First, carbon markets are bound to cover mainly the activities of wealthy and powerful corporations. Second, carbon markets are excessively complex and their operations typically lack transparency. Third, information asymmetries persist between public servants and private firms regarding ETSs. Fourth, target setting is a political, highly partisan process. These four features give private firms the power to manipulate at their advantage the rules of a carbon market. Three other features explain why the motivations of agents under an ETS will most of the time be corrupted: carbon markets trivialize the harm done by carbon emissions; they alter our perception of nature’s value; and they crowd-out our intrinsic motivations. Thus, influential private firms will have the power and willingness to bend carbon markets at their advantage

Carbon fibers · Carbon market · Economics · Greenhouse gas · Law and economics · Climate Change and Geoengineering · Climate Change Policy and Economics · Economic and Environmental Valuation · Materials Science · Geology

  • Capital in the Twenty-First Century

    Thomas Piketty•Capital in the Twenty-First Century•2014

  • The Gift Relationship

    Richard Titmuss, Richard Morris Titmuss•Gift Relationship•2018

  • The Price of Inequality

    Open Access•Joseph E Stiglitz, Joseph Stiglitz•New Perspectives Quarterly•2013

  • Motivation crowding by economic incentives in conservation policy

    Open Access•Julian Rode, Erik Gomez‐baggethun et al.•Ecological Economics•2015

  • The ethics of emissions trading

    Open Access•Edward A Page•Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews…•2013

  • Markets, Morality and Climate Change

    Simon Caney•New Political Economy•2010

  • Where the Action Is

    Open Access•G A Cohen•Philosophy & Public Affairs•1997

  • The hidden costs of carbon commodification

    Edward A Page•Democratization•2012

  • L'idéologie marchande au service de la biodiversité

    Hélène Tordjman, Boisvert et al.•Mouvements•2012

Citation velocityhistorical
Highly citedNo

Tools

Open DOISci-HubOpen Access
Ethnos_APP • Open Source Project • MIT License • Frontend v2.0.0 • Privacy and Cookies • API Documentation: api.ethnos.app/docs • API Source Code: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17049435 • Frontend Source Code: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17050053 • cruz.rio.br • Expectantes Misericordiae