The Normative Common Ground
Blame and Communication
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 17189367 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Taylor Madigan (0000-0002-1642-097X, corresponding author), Edward Schwartz, Edward N Schwartz |
| Year | 2026 |
| Volume | 136 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 547-568 |
| Publication date | 2026-03-23 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Ethics (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0014-1704 • E-ISSN: 1539-297X |
| Publisher | University of Chicago Press (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1086/739653 |
| OpenAlex | W7140106612 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 24 |
Many theories of responsibility claim that holding someone responsible is “incipiently communicative,” but it has been difficult to pin down just what this amounts to. We offer an account of (1) a distinctive sense in which blaming is communicative, (2) what is communicated, and (3) how communication is achieved. Building on the work of Miranda Fricker and others, our account is that blaming is communicative in the sense that it updates a body of mutually represented expectations—normative common ground—which happens via a process of presupposition accommodation
Blame · Normative · Normative social influence · Embodied and Extended Cognition · Free Will and Agency · Philosophical Ethics and Theory
Role Obligations
On the Representation of Context
Scorekeeping in a language game
Presuppositions
Trust and Antitrust
The Authority of Hate Speech
Presupposition Projection and the Semantics of Attitude Verbs
Defining common ground
Belief
When normal is normative
Be Articulate
Criticism as Conversation 1
Pragmatics
Knowing and Asserting
Expression for Expressivists
Iteration Principles in Epistemology I
Iteration Principles in Epistemology II
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |