Wittgenstein On Moral Certainty
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 17568177 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Cecilie Eriksen (0000-0003-3080-8337, Department of Philosophy and the History of Ideas Aarhus University Aarhus C Denmark), Anne‐Marie Søndergaard Christensen (0000-0002-1416-0051, Department of Design, Media and Educational Science University of Southern Denmark Odense Denmark), A I Christensen (corresponding author) |
| Year | 2026 |
| Publication date | 2026-04-24 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophical Investigations (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0190-0536 • E-ISSN: 1467-9205 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/phin.70028 |
| OpenAlex | W7155516698 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 40 |
Moral certainty is a growing research area in philosophy with implications for current debates on hinge epistemology, moral change and deep moral disagreements. Despite several distinctive lines of disagreement, two assumptions are shared in the current discussion of moral certainty. The first is the acknowledgement of Wittgenstein's work On Certainty as the main source of inspiration. The second is the understanding that Wittgenstein's later writings do not feature any work on the topic of moral certainty. In this article, we challenge the latter standard assumption. We show that Wittgenstein did consider examples of moral certainty and can also be said to have a conception of moral certainty in his later writings. This paves the way for future scholars to turn to Wittgenstein's writings not only as a source of inspiration for work on moral certainty, but also as a direct source of insight into this specific topic
Acknowledgement · Certainty · Moral disengagement · Moral psychology · Moral reasoning · Social cognitive theory of morality · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Wittgensteinian philosophy and applications
Moral Change
Understanding Wittgenstein’s On Certainty
The Logic of Deep Disagreements
Knowing and Acknowledging
Moral Certainty and the Foundations of Morality
Deep disagreement and hinge epistemology
III. Some Developments in Wittgenstein's View of Ethics
Moral Escapism and Applied Ethics
The Later Wittgenstein on Expressive Moral Judgements
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |