Fiscal Transparency Ranking and Corruption
Theory and New Evidence from China
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 17568218 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Jing He (0000-0002-1954-2892, University of North Georgia), Zhang Ping (0000-0003-1667-3157, Fudan University), Jekyung Lee (0000-0002-5197-4951, Chungnam National University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2026 |
| Pages | 1-23 |
| Publication date | 2026-02-27 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | International Journal of Public Administration (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0190-0692 • E-ISSN: 1532-4265 |
| Publisher | Taylor & Francis (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/01900692.2026.2618682 |
| OpenAlex | W7133710416 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 96 |
China · Corporate governance · Corruption and Economic Development · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy · Media Influence and Politics
Years of Research on Rent Seeking 2
Public Spending in the 20th Century
Fiscal Institutions and Fiscal Performance
Public Service Management by Numbers
What Do Corruption Indices Measure?
Reward structures and the allocation of talent
State Capacity and Local Agent Control in China
Political Selection in China: The Complementary Roles of Connections and Performance
Electoral Rules and Corruption
The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft
Political turnover and economic performance
Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data
Fiscal transparency, legal system and perception of the control on corruption
A path for ranking success
Does More Transparency Go Along With Better Governance
Controlling Corruption
The Worldwide Governance Indicators
Governance regimes, corruption and growth
Decentralization and corruption
Are You Being Served? Political Accountability and Quality of Government
Accountability and Corruption
The causes of corruption
Who Must Pay Bribes and How Much? Evidence from a Cross Section of Firms
Fiscal Decentralization
Internet information-seeking and its relation to support for access to government records
Federal freedom of information policy
Persistence of corruption
Assessing Administrative Accountability
Citizen Attitudes Toward Transparency in Local Government
Toward Participatory and Transparent Governance
Central Government Budget Practices and Transparency
Truth in Government and the Politicization of Public Service Advice
A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures
The Simple Economics of Extortion
Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts
Do transparency mechanisms reduce government corruption? A meta-analysis
Measuring and Promoting Budget Transparency
Policy Responsiveness in Post-communist Europe
A Theory of Social Comparison Processes
The Impact of Public Officials’ Corruption on the Size and Allocation of U.S. State Spending
The Performance-Trust Link
Benefiting from Public Sector Innovation
Transparency is not Enough
Understanding Democracy
Sources of Transparency
Why efforts to fight corruption can undermine the social contract
Indignation or Resignation
Does Performance Matter? Evaluating Political Selection Along the Chinese Administrative Ladder
What Have We Learned About the Causes of Corruption from Ten Years of Cross-National Empirical Research
Is Democracy Good for the Poor
Transparency, Political Polarization, and Political Budget Cycles in OECD Countries
What Is Transparency
Organizational Legitimacy
How to Subvert Democracy
The Discipline of Rankings
Show Me the Money
A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action
Supervising Local Cadres in China
Does ranking stimulate government performance? Evidence from China's key environmental protection cities
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |