Social Robots as “props”
A Human-Centric Explanation of Their Moral Agency and Significance
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 17812235 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Takuya Mizukami (0000-0003-1086-8746, RIKEN Center for Advanced Intelligence Project, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2026 |
| Volume | 18 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Publication date | 2026-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | International Journal of Social Robotics (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1875-4791 • E-ISSN: 1875-4805 |
| Publisher | Springer Science+Business Media (PUBLISHER • DE) |
| DOI | 10.1007/s12369-025-01349-9 |
| OpenAlex | W7124859445 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 28 |
Social robots powered by generative artificial intelligence (AI) are increasingly integrated into various domains of daily life, such as education, nursing care, and entertainment. This integration prompts an important question concerning their moral status: Should we understand them as moral agents or merely as tools? Although understanding social robots as moral agents in a relational way is appealing, it can lead to confusion regarding the attribution of moral responsibility. This paper proposes viewing the moral status of social robots as “props,” drawing on Walton’s fiction theory. This approach allows us to distinguish fictional truths about robots from the real circumstances in which humans produce them. The “props” perspective helps us understand the agency of social robots as a product of human imaginative activities or “games” facilitated by these robots. Thus, we can distinguish between a robot’s agent-like appearance and its moral status—a crucial distinction when attributing moral responsibility. Finally, drawing on this perspective, we emphasize the importance of evaluating social robots ethically in a manner similar to fictional works, rather than through a purely engineering-based approach
Agency (philosophy) · Moral agency · Moral disengagement · Moral reasoning · Perspective (graphical) · Robot · Social cognitive theory of morality · Social robot · Ethics and Social Impacts of AI · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Social Robot Interaction and HRI
Moralizing Technology
Artificial agency, consciousness, and the criteria for moral agency
The responsibility gap
On the Morality of Artificial Agents
Logic and Conversation
A fictional dualism model of social robots
Personal Robots, Appearance, and Human Good
AI, agency and responsibility
Virtual moral agency, virtual moral responsibility
ChatGPT is not OK! That’s not (just) because it lies
The issue of moral consideration in robot ethics
From Assigning to Designing Technological Agency
Precis of Mimesis as Make-Believe
The March of the robot dogs
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |